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Abstract 
 
Conflict has marked civilization from Biblical times to the present day. Each of us, with 
our different and competing interests, and our desires to pursue those interests, have over time 
wronged another person. Not surprisingly then, forgiveness is a concern of individuals and 
groups—communities, countries, religious groups, races—yet it is a complex idea that 
philosophers, theologians, political scientists, and psychologists have grappled with. Some have 
argued that forgiveness is a therapeutic means for overcoming guilt, pain, and anger. Forgiveness 
is often portrayed as a coping mechanism—how often we hear the phrase, “forgive and forget,” 
as an arrangement to help two parties surmount the complications of disagreement. But 
forgiveness is not simply a modus vivendi; the ability to forgive and conversely to ask for 
forgiveness, is counted as an admirable trait and virtue.  
 This essay will explore the nature of forgiveness, which in Christian dogma is often 
posited as an unqualified virtue. The secular world has appropriated the Christian notion of 
forgiveness as such a virtue—but are there instances wherein offering forgiveness is morally 
inappropriate or dangerous? I will consider the situations in which forgiveness, understood in 
this essay as the overcoming of resentment, may not be a virtue—when perhaps maintaining 
resentment is as virtuous, if not more virtuous, than forgiving. I will explain the various ethical 
frameworks involved in understanding forgiveness as a virtue, and the relationship between 
them. I will argue that within Divine Command Theory forgiveness is a virtue—and thus morally 
right—because God commands it. This ethical system has established forgiveness as 
unconditional, an idea which has been adopted into popular culture. With virtue ethics in mind, 
which holds virtues to be those traits which benefit the person who possesses them, contributing 
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to the good life, I will argue unqualified forgiveness is not always a virtue, as it will not always 
benefit the victim.  
Because there is no way to avoid wrongdoing, humans are confronted with the question 
of forgiveness with every indiscretion. Its limits, its possibilities, its relationship to one’s 
character—forgiveness is a concern of all people at some time if for no other reason than the 
plain fact that the past cannot be undone. I will be evaluating the idea of forgiveness as a virtue, 
in contrast to its counterpart, resentment. How can forgiveness be a response to evil, a way to 
renounce resentment, and a means of creating a positive self-narrative? And what happens when 
a sense of moral responsibility is impossible to reconcile with the Christian (and now, 
secularized imperative of) forgiveness? Is it ever not virtuous to forgive? 
In an attempt to answer that question I will argue that there are indeed times when 
forgiveness is not a virtue, specifically: when forgiveness compromises one’s own self-respect; 
when it is not compatible with respect for the moral community; and when the offender is 
unapologetic. The kind of offense I have in mind is a dehumanizing one, one that intends to 
diminish another person’s worth or humanity. These are moral injuries, to which I will argue 
resentment is a better response than forgiveness when the three qualifications cannot be met. 
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Introduction 
 
The short story “The Capital of the World” by Ernest Hemingway begins with the telling 
of a joke:  
 
Madrid is full of boys named Paco, which is diminutive of the name Fransisco, and there is a 
Madrid joke about a father who came to Madrid and inserted an advertisement in the personal 
columns of El Liberal which said: PACO MEET ME AT HOTEL MANTANA NOON TUESDAY ALL IS 
FORGIVEN PAPA and how a squadron of Guardia Civil had to be called to disperse the eight 
hundred young men who answered the advertisement.1   
  
 The joke is about the popularity of the name “Paco,” but as the eminent theologian and 
public scholar Miroslav Volf has pointed out, it only makes sense because of the ubiquity of the 
human desire to be forgiven.2 Eight hundred Pacos showed up at the Hotel that Tuesday 
afternoon, but more significantly, eight hundred young men were longing for forgiveness. The 
joke demonstrates the powerful desire to right our wrongs, and restore relationships. For Volf, 
Hemingway’s joke shows the value placed on forgiveness because it is the “uniquely important 
way we deal with wrongdoing.”3 The significance ascribed to forgiveness and those who 
dispense it can only be understood in conjunction with an explanation of forgiveness as a virtue, 
both theologically and in the secularly.    
I have looked for and found, I think, a modest, but important function of religion that 
allows us to understand Paco’s story, in a world that needs to ameliorate conflicts over values, 
rituals, and interests—material, moral, economic, political, and personal. This function is 
forgiveness. There are no other social institutions or cultural sets of values that do more than 
religions to encourage, organize, ritualize, and facilitate the resolution of hatreds, and 
resentments caused by the perception of having been painfully wronged.  
                                                
1 Hemingway, The Capital of the World, 49.  
2 Volf, Free of Charge, 127. 
3 Ibid., 128. 
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While religions have much to say about forgiveness, so too do secular disciplines such as 
philosophy, psychology, and sociology. Theologically, forgiveness is related to doctrinal issues 
of original sin and human fallibility, at least in the Christian context, which will be the focus of 
my research, as it has been the focus of most of the existing research that explores that central 
relationship between Christianity and forgiveness. Further, in order to minimize the scope of my 
inquiry, I have chosen Christianity as it is the dominant religious tradition in Western culture—
especially in the United States.  
Because one major Christian belief is that all humans are born sinners who must be 
forgiven by God in order to attain ultimate salvation, the dynamic of repentance and forgiveness 
is fixed in Christian thought.  Through a relationship with Jesus Christ and atonement for one’s 
inherited sin by way of a strong Christian faith, lifestyle, good works, or confession, 
forgiveness—what may be considered the greatest form of God’s love—will be bestowed. 
Christians find the strength to forgive others through the undying desire to be forgiven when they 
themselves stand before God. We might say that secular disciplines and scholars are concerned 
with the benefits of forgiveness, such as the ability to reconcile interpersonal relationships and 
alleviate crippling hate and tension within society. But perhaps forgiveness owes its invariable 
prominence and support in popular culture and secular society to its vitality in Christian doctrine.  
But as every virtue taken to an extreme may become a vice, Christianity has not only 
encouraged forgiveness for harms done, but it also may be the case that Christian teachings not 
only encourage forgiveness but may enforce unconditional forgiveness. One way or the other, so 
important are theological functions regarding forgiveness that, for the purpose of this paper, I 
would like to cite religion as a manifestation and mechanism of and by which we atone for our 
wrong-doings, and by so doing resolve both our psychological and sociological feelings of guilt 
3 
 
 
 
and shame, and by which we find ourselves able to live together with a variety of other and 
different believers and non-believers in multicultural and diverse societies. The danger, I will 
argue, is not in forgiveness itself, but in the way theological tenets of forgiveness are unqualified 
and the adoption of these principles by society at-large. 
Conflict has marked civilization from the earliest records of human history to the present 
day. Most people would agree that all humans, with our different and competing interests, and 
our desires to pursue those interests, have over time wronged another person. Not surprisingly 
then, forgiveness is a concern of individuals and groups—communities, countries, religious 
groups, races—yet it is a complex idea that philosophers, theologians, political scientists, and 
psychologists have grappled with. Some have argued that forgiveness is a therapeutic means for 
overcoming guilt, pain, and anger. Forgiveness is often portrayed as a coping mechanism—we 
often hear the phrase, “forgive and forget,” as an arrangement to help two parties surmount the 
complications of disagreement. But forgiveness is not simply a modus vivendi; most people 
count the ability to forgive and conversely to ask for forgiveness, as an admirable trait and virtue.  
Forgiveness is generally viewed as a positive counter-phenomenon to the inevitable 
instances of wrong-doing that persist in all societies. In our culture, people often regard the 
degree to which one is willing to accept another’s apology is indicative of his or her general 
disposition. One who refuses to grant forgiveness may be called callous, bitter, and resentful. On 
the other hand, the person who offers forgiveness quickly and indiscriminately may be called 
spineless and cowardly.  
Because most people regard wrongdoing as pervasive and perhaps inevitable, humans are 
confronted with the question of forgiveness with every indiscretion. Its limits, its possibilities, its 
relationship to one’s character—forgiveness is a concern of nearly all people at some time if for 
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no other reason than the plain fact that the past cannot be undone. Forgiveness is humanity’s 
response to this frustrating reality. Hannah Arendt commented on forgiveness as a response to 
the irreversibility of the past, “the possible redemption from the predicament of irreversibility—
of being unable to undo what one has done though one did not, and could not, have known what 
he was doing—is the faculty of forgiving.”4  
Bishop Joseph Butler, an eighteenth-century English theologian and philosopher who 
wrote important treatises on resentment and forgiveness, gave two seminal sermons regarding 
forgiveness as a virtue. Butler began both sermons with an excerpt from Matthew: 
Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine  enemy: 
 But I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that 
 hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you. 5   
 
“Love thy enemy” is arguably one of the most difficult tasks set forth for Christians—perhaps 
this is the reason we exalt those with the ability to do this; we need only to look at the Holocaust, 
terrorism, war, and genocide to know that the command to love our enemies is often lost 
amongst rage and hatred. But Butler believed that to love those who have wronged us is in fact 
the “law of our nature.” In his sermon, he used a hypothetical situation a person appearing before 
God “naked and without disguise before the judge of all the earth, to give account of your 
behavior towards your fellow creatures.”6  Therefore, the reader is compelled to reflect on his or 
her ability to forgive—and according to Butler, there can be nothing more dreadful than the 
reflection that one had been implacable, without mercy. How can one ask for the forgiving spirit 
to be exercised in his or her favor? Then, Butler posits the opposite: a good person comes before 
God knowing he had been “meek, forgiving, and merciful; that he had in simplicity of heart been 
ready to pass over offenses against himself,” this person remembers the declaration that “if ye 
                                                
4 Arendt, The Human Condition, 237.  
5 Matthew  5:43-44 
6 Butler, Sermon IX. Upon Resentment and Forgiveness of Injuries 
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forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will likewise forgive you” and is relieved.7 
Butler uses this scenario to demonstrate the necessity of forgiveness, pardon, reconciliation of 
our fellow persons, as we hope for the absolution of our own sins, for peace of mind in death, 
and for divine mercy.  
Reconciliation is surely an artifact of evil—given that evil seems ubiquitous, how can we 
mitigate it? Forgiveness, as the contemporary philosopher Charles Griswold writes, “is a prime 
candidate in part because it does not reduce either to resigned acceptance or to deluded 
avoidance…how can one accept fully that moral evil has been done and yet see its perpetrator in 
a way that…in a sense…simultaneously forswears revenge, aspires to give up resentment, and 
incorporates the injury suffered into a narrative of self that allows the victim and even the 
narrator to flourish?”8 Griswold’s claim represents the popular view that the ability to forgive the 
injuries befallen to oneself might have redeeming qualities, while resentment and revenge are 
often conflated with a sentiment of something suspect, something used to inflict pain on another 
person.  
In this paper, I will challenge popular notions of forgiveness as a virtue, in contrast to its 
counterpart, resentment. How can forgiveness be a response to evil, a way to renounce 
resentment, and a means of creating a positive self-narrative? Might we look at those who are, as 
Butler says, “meek, forgiving, and merciful…ready to pass over offenses against himself” as 
morally irresponsible? How can we forgive all evils unilaterally? Must not we discern what evils 
can and cannot be forgiven? What happens when a sense of moral responsibility is impossible to 
reconcile with Butler’s imperative of forgiveness? Is it ever not virtuous to forgive? 
                                                
7 Butler, Sermon IX. Upon Resentment and Forgiveness of Injuries 
8 Griswold, Forgiveness, xxv.  
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 I will begin with a broad introduction to the notions of forgiveness and resentment, 
focusing explicitly on the way the two share an arena and can be considered as the two possible 
responses to an injury against oneself. I will then clarify the different ethical theories and 
perspectives that will be relevant to this discussion. The next section will demonstrate the 
weightiness of my questions by way of a discussion of the irreversibility of time, and the ways in 
which the past is immutable. Following these introductory sections I will clarify the kind of 
transgressions that are at stake in my inquiry, namely those that violate the moral laws and result 
in moral injuries. From there, the paper will move into a discussion of forgiveness from social 
and psychological perspectives, from Christian perspectives, and briefly clarify what forgiveness 
is not, in order to paint as clear and comprehensive a picture of forgiveness as a virtue. I will 
argue that there are two types of forgiveness—conditional and unconditional which will be 
important to my own argument against unconditioned forgiveness. The next sections examine 
resentment from both social and psychological, and theological perspectives. I then present 
several defenses of resentment from the existing research on forgiveness, as they form the 
foundation of my own contributions to the existing dialogue.  
Finally, as I construct my own argument, I will claim that there exists such a concept as 
an unforgiveable evil, which dehumanizes others and attempt to diminish their moral standing 
(and offer potential arguments to the contrary). Then I will develop my original contribution to 
the present discourse, an argument based on the limits of forgiveness in the face of 
dehumanizing, unforgiveable evil—specifically that there are three times in which it is not 
virtuous to forgive: when forgiveness is not compatible with self-respect; respect for others in the 
moral community; and when the offender is unapologetic. The paper will close with a 
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consideration of potential counter arguments to the three instances that I have put forth, and final 
concluding remarks. 
 
Introduction to the Concepts of Forgiveness and Resentment 
Many analysts of forgiveness introduce and define the concept in relation to resentment. 
Hannah Arendt described forgiveness as a way of escaping the cycle of resentment and revenge. 
To forgive, according to Arendt, is to renounce rage and bitterness and lay the foundation for an 
amended relationship with the wrongdoer; this makes it something unique and notable about 
human life.9 Arendt thought forgiveness did not receive enough attention as a secular matter as it 
was presumed to be primarily theologically oriented. To be sure, the questions of forgiveness, 
sin, evil, and divine clemency, are fundamental to most religions. But iniquities and 
transgressions are also human problems and transcend the bounds of religion, so they must be 
addressed by faithful and non-faithful alike as victims and as perpetrators. Thus the problem of 
forgiveness is not only a theological one (though one’s propensity to forgive is often driven by 
theology), but one that should concern all persons, regardless of faith.  
Joseph Butler is thought by some to be the first person to analyze the attitudes of 
forgiveness and resentment in relation to each other. Butler was concerned with the passion of 
resentment, and how an omnipotent and loving God could allow us to express such an unloving 
attitude.10 For Butler, the excess of resentment—not the attitude itself—is problematic, and we 
need forgiveness to overcome resentment before it dominates us. Resentment, for Butler, does in 
fact express one’s commitment to morality, but one should not be dominated by any passion 
(such as resentment), and thus forgiveness is that virtue which checks resentment. 
                                                
9 Arendt, The Human Condition, 236-7.  
10 Haber, Forgiveness, 16.  
8 
 
 
 
This paper draws upon Butler’s influential model of forgiveness. To be sure, other 
models of forgiveness exist. But forgiveness understood as the repression and rejection of 
resentment will be the best lens through which to examine the dichotomy between the virtuous 
and non-virtuous conceptions of both forgiveness and resentment. It should be noted that 
Butler’s model tells us something about the way in which resentment emerges as an attitude. To 
suggest that forgiveness must prevail over resentment suggests resentment is a natural—and 
according to Butler, not inherently wrong—response to injury. From this we might conclude that 
in order for forgiveness to take place, a victim must first feel resentment.  
Moreover, the presence of the resentful attitude implies at the very minimum an 
acknowledgement of the injury as wrong—the transgression has been recognized as such. P.F. 
Strawson maintains that forgiveness is related to resentment in this way. He explains that asking 
for forgiveness is to know one is resented, because seeking forgiveness is to “partly acknowledge 
that the attitude displayed in our action was such as might properly be resented; partly to 
repudiate that attitude. To forgive is to accept the repudiation, to forswear the resentment.”11 We 
see then that for both the offender and the victim (at least in cases where the offender is 
repentant, or asking for forgiveness), in order for forgiveness to transpire, first an 
acknowledgment of the injury and its immorality must occur, followed by the resentful attitude. 
Only after resentment has been established can forgiveness overcome it.   
Many theorists have followed closely in Butler’s theoretical footsteps. For example, 
Kathleen Dean Moore has argued that “the attitude of forgiveness is characterized by…the lack 
of personal resentment for the injury.”12 Likewise, Martin Hughes echoes Butler in his 
description of forgiveness as the “cancellation of deserved hostilities and substitution of 
                                                
11 Haber, Forgiveness, 11.  
12 Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the Public Interest, 184.  
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friendlier attitudes.”13 His use of the concepts of “cancellation,” and “substitution,” are directly 
related to Butler’s model of forgiveness as a replacement for resentment.  
But not all cases where resentment is overcome counts as instances of forgiveness. Jeffrie 
Murphy has described forgiveness in accordance with Butler’s model as the “resolute 
overcoming of the anger and hatred that are naturally directed toward a person who has done one 
an unjustified and non-excused moral injury.”14 But Murphy expands on this idea by qualifying 
it with the stipulation that “ceasing to resent will not constitute forgiveness unless it is done for a 
moral reason. Forgiveness is not the overcoming of resentment simpliciter; it is rather this: 
forswearing resentment on moral grounds.15 Murphy has adopted Butler’s view and offered an 
addition to it by suggesting forgiveness is not just overcoming hatred, anger, and resentment 
because these passions can be dangerously excessive, but the act of forgiveness must also be on 
moral grounds.  
The concept of forgiveness resists any one precise definition, but the following definition 
comes close to embodying it: “[forgiveness is] a reduction of negative responses and the 
production of positive one toward an event, person or group…change toward a perceived 
transgressor…a process often involving decreased motivation to retaliate against a (perceived) 
offender, decreasing motivation to maintain estrangement from the offender, and increasing 
motivation toward conciliation and goodwill for the offender.”16 Forgiveness in these contexts is 
seen as a virtue and “virtues are always thought to be praiseworthy motives for action…virtuous 
acts and motives are things that we want to encourage because we strive to be virtuous 
                                                
13 Hughes, Forgiveness, 113. 
14 Hampton and Murphy, Forgiveness and Mercy, 15. 
15Ibid., 15 
16 Escher, How Does Religion Promote Forgiveness?, 101.  
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persons.”17   All of these components are at least in part related to resentment. Forgiveness, as a 
virtue, in the wake of Butler’s sermon, has come to be defined as that which overcomes and 
represses resentment, so that the two attitudes are juxtaposed. 
 
Ethical Frameworks 
Because I have suggested that forgiveness is a virtue, I should frame my argument in the 
context of different ethical systems which make it possible to think about the nature of what is 
virtuous. How do the various thinkers and theories that I will draw upon fit within the framework 
of meta-ethics? If forgiveness is a virtue, it would be useful to have a clear idea of the nature of 
this type of virtue and how it reflects on our moral character. 
As Aurel Kolnai states in his paper, Forgiveness, “forgiveness is pre-eminently an ethical 
subject, and a paper written about it cannot help being a paper in ethics.”18 But others have 
argued forgiveness is a strictly religious concept, not an ethical one. Paul Lehmann claims 
forgiveness is comprehensible in the context of the relation between God and man, “marked by 
the awesome holiness of God, by man’s offense against this holiness, by man’s guilt, and by 
man’s need for assurance that his sin against God has been pardoned and that right relations 
between God and man have been restored.”19 So here are two competing frameworks from which 
we can consider forgiveness: one I will argue is closest to Divine Command theory, the other, the 
virtue ethics. Both are ethical systems—Kolnai is correct in arguing there is something ethical at 
stake. More specifically, the unconditional status of forgiveness in Christian thought operates 
from Divine Command theory, whereas my conception of conditioned forgiveness is situated 
within virtue ethics, and I will examine the nature of forgiveness as a virtue.  
                                                
17 McGary, Forgiveness, 343. 
18 Kolnai, Forgiveness, 91.  
19 Lewis, On Forgiveness, 236. 
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 I am critiquing unconditional forgiveness as understood through Divine Command 
Theory, a meta-ethical theory, which proposes that an action's status as morally good is 
dependent on whether it is commanded by God. What is moral is determined by what God 
commands, so to be moral is to follow God’s commands. In one reading of the notions of 
forgiveness, Divine Command seems to say that forgiveness is unconditional. So Divine 
Command theory has provided the foundation for the belief in unconditional forgiveness that I 
will argue has trickled out into popular culture. As Meirlys Lewis has claimed, there is a logical 
dimension to forgiveness where it is “not just an occasional requirement, but where it is an 
absolute requirement…structured and defined by certain beliefs about God, about the love of 
God, the mercy of God, divine grace and compassion.”20 Kierkegaard presents a particular 
analysis of Christian love and likewise Christian forgiveness with secular love and forgiveness. 
The uniqueness of Christian forgiveness lies in its “unconditionality and in that it maintains a 
constant unchanging relation between the believer and the trespasser. Christian forgiveness does 
not require the repentance of the one who is to be forgiven. It does not require reference to 
mitigating circumstances, to the possible ill consequences of forgiveness. It does not require a 
moral justification of itself.”21 For believers, this makes forgiveness an eternal obligation, a 
religious demand. The process of forgiveness involves perceptions about the relationship 
between God and the world which color how one perceives relations with other humans. There is 
no consideration of the moral, conceptions about “sin, primordial evil, the distance between what 
is worthless, insignificant and what is infinitely good, perfect, are inseparable from the language 
of prayer and confession.”22  
                                                
20 Lewis, On Forgiveness, 242. 
21 Ibid., 243 
22 Ibid., 245 
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Another way of approaching forgiveness is through ethics, and this is the context in 
which my argument has been developed. Kolnai has talked about forgiveness not as a “strict 
obligation,” but a quasi-obligation which has its source in virtue, and reveals virtue. “It may be 
looked upon…as the epitome and culmination of morality.”23 And as Lewis argues, “the more 
virtuous I am, then, the more disposed I am to forgive.”24 Thus, forgiveness is not a duty, but it is 
a virtue. I am not arguing that forgiveness is always wrong, but I am arguing that from a certain 
ethical framework, virtue ethics, unconditional forgiveness subsumed under Divine Command 
theory, is flawed because it cannot account for circumstantial nuances, and is problematic when 
applied without qualifications.  
Virtue ethics supposes that the possession of virtues, understood as deep and relatively 
permanent traits of character and intellect, is a criterion of moral and non-moral worth: the 
virtues are necessary if one is to be a good person.25 And, one of the features of ancient thought 
is that virtues benefit those who possess them. For Butler, an important benefit of forgiveness is 
the role that it plays in not letting our resentment towards wrongdoing go beyond appropriate 
limits. It is believed that if rightful resentment goes for too long unchecked, it will be so 
consuming that the person doing the resenting will suffer. An Aristotelian approach to virtue 
ethics adopts this principle, and defines the virtues in terms of their contribution to the person’s 
thriving; what makes a trait a virtue is because it is a constituent of the good life for human 
beings.26 With this conception of virtue in mind, I will argue against unqualified forgiveness as a 
virtue, as it will not always be good for the possessor, particularly in relation to the three 
qualifications I have in mind.  
                                                
23 Kolnai, Forgiveness, 105.  
24 Lewis, On Forgiveness, 240.  
25 Brady, The Value of the Virtues, 86.  
26 Ibid. 
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Of course, Divine Command theory and virtue ethics are not the only two ethical systems 
at work. The final consideration is of conditional forgiveness, which comes out of a 
deontological understanding of forgiveness. To say unconditional forgiveness is always wrong 
would be to overstate my argument. Rather, I will demonstrate three specific times when 
unconditional forgiveness is morally wrong. My criticism of unqualified forgiveness in these 
three instances is closely aligned with the deontological rhetoric of Kant. Kant’s categorical 
imperative is that on whatever maxim one has based his or her actions, one would also want that 
maxim be a universal law. In fact, in Resurrection, Lewis has argued that Leo Tolstoy comes 
close to admitting that if unconditional forgiveness were to be universal law, then the result 
would be complete anarchy27 Forgiveness under the three circumstances I have described—when 
self-respect is compromised, when the moral community is threatened, and when the offender is 
unrepentant—cannot be universal law, perhaps only conditioned forgiveness could succeed as 
such a maxim.  
Finally, the utilitarian ethic enters the conversation when we consider theories on the 
emotional benefits of forgiveness. A utilitarian view would regard forgiveness as a virtue if 
dispensing forgiveness will bring the greatest happiness to the greatest number. In Utilitarianism, 
John Stuart Mill stated, "In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of 
the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbor as oneself, 
constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.”28 Our own desire to be forgiven then—
religious injunctions aside—would constitute the foundation for the utilitarian view. Further 
utilitarian rhetoric purports that we learn to associate virtuous acts with pleasure.  Thus, we learn 
to enjoy doing virtuous acts, which in turn will bring us pleasure. The positive associations with 
                                                
27 Lewis, On Forgiveness, 245. 
28 Mill, Utilitarianism, 64.  
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forgiveness that are understood as gaining peace of mind, closure, and letting go of resentment, 
categorize forgiveness as a virtue because it comes with a feeling of pleasure. I will refute these 
utilitarian-esque claims because they lack the ethical considerations that constitute a moral 
understanding and dispensation of forgiveness.  
 
Irreversibility of the Past 
 Another important aspect in analyzing resentment and forgiveness is addressing how they 
relate to the resolution of evil and the irreversibility of time. In his book, Mea Culpa, Nicholas 
Tavuchis refers to the human ability to apologize as “paradoxical and talismanic,” which is an 
observation worth explicating. Tavuchis argues that if the primary task of an apology is to 
resolve discord and restore the moral order by eliminating the effects of past conflict or injury, 
then the system of apology and forgiveness cannot be successful. Why? Tavuchis, like Arendt, 
rightly and simply perceives that “because an apology, no matter how sincere or effective, does 
not and cannot undo what has been done. And yet, in a mysterious way and according to its own 
logic, this is precisely what it manages to do”29 Arendt posits that forgiveness “serves to undo 
the deeds of the past, whose ‘sins’ hang like Damocles’ sword over every new generation.”30   
It is on an experiential level that we know the feeling of resentment and the process of 
forgiveness, as part of the weightiness of the human condition. When injury occurs, we tend to 
consider the virtues of forgiveness as a given, but the entire process is much more paradoxical. It 
is humanity’s attempt to emotionally, socially, psychologically, and religiously reverse what is 
fait accompli; this is of course, metaphysically impossible. And the task is more difficult when 
utterly disgraceful acts of evil are under consideration. Yet society constantly encourages us to 
                                                
29 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 5. 
30 Arendt, The Human Condition, 237.  
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forgive: therapists prescribe it, and the Bible commands it. But for a person in the wake of 
unimaginable moral evil, is forgiveness too much to ask? The mere metaphysical truth that the 
past remains in the past, untouchable to us, creates a significant barrier for many when 
confronted with the pressure of forgiveness. Saint Augustine advised, cum dilectione hominum et 
odio vitiorum—“with love for mankind and hatred of sins,” or popularly, “hate the sin and not 
the sinner.” But is this a lofty, unattainable ideal? As a moral theory, Saint Augustine’s work 
underlies much of the discourse on forgiveness both religious and secular. But in practice, I will 
argue Tavuchis’ paradox more closely mirrors the basic human experience—we cannot reverse 
time but in offering forgiveness we attempt to erase the effects of past transgressions, and in a 
way, undo it. I hope this brief discussion of the irreversibility of time demonstrates the ongoing 
significance of my question, as all people must face this metaphysical reality.  
 
Moral Evil, Moral Order, Moral Injury 
 The dynamics of forgiveness and resentment generally involve what many thinkers call 
moral evil. Moral evil, in the way that I will use it, refers to a transgression of the norms of the 
moral community. In his seminal essay, Freedom and Resentment, P.F. Strawson defines 
forgiveness and resentment as two “reactive attitudes,” towards others in the moral community.31 
In order to have such a reactive attitude toward another moral agent, the wronged person must 
believe the perpetrator intentionally committed the act—his argument is that we can only express 
resentment and forgiveness toward those who we believe to be culpable moral agents. The forces 
of nature, for instance, cannot understand the moral value or integrity of its victims, but we do 
believe other humans are capable of doing so. 
                                                
31 Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 22. 
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An attitude of resentment is connected to morality. Resentment can be considered to be a 
response to a personal affront, some hurtful act committed against us. Because we believe we are 
entitled to treatment in accordance with our moral value (as sentient beings in the moral 
community), we are insulted when we believed someone who has wronged us has disregarded 
our status as such. Resentment then might be understood as a response to the “symbolic 
communications” of moral injury—“intentional wrongdoing insults us and attempts…to degrade 
us—and thus it involves a kind of injury that is not merely tangible and sensible. It is moral 
injury, and we care about such injuries.”32 Here it should be noted that this sort of injury, from an 
observer’s perspective, might seem completely subjective—the extent to which one feels insulted 
often is related to one’s own conception of his or her self-worth. Admittedly, the degree of the 
response to an injury can vary in each particular circumstance from indignation to devastation. 
But the belief that the injury was intentional—and that because we exist in the moral community, 
it has diminished our status—is important to the discussion of forgiveness and resentment.  
The reaction to a moral injury often manifests itself in what some have called “moral 
anger.”33 Moral anger refers to the circumstances wherein the motivation behind resentment is 
the “desire for the moral order to be restored…moral commitment is not merely a matter of 
intellectual allegiance; it requires an emotional allegiance as well, for a moral person is not 
simply a person who holds an abstract belief that certain things are wrong. The moral person is 
also motivated to do something about the wrong.”34 Resentment then can be a type of response to 
moral anger, wherein the injured party remains angry due to an allegiance to the moral order.    
                                                
32 Hampton and Murphy, Forgiveness and Mercy, 44.  
33 Griswold calls this morally motivated anger, “the relevant species of anger” (Forgiveness: A Philosophical 
Exploration, 212). Jean Hampton (Forgiveness and Mercy, 80) calls this “moral hatred” and I explore this concept 
as Hampton uses it in more depth on page 43 of this paper. 
34 Holmgren, Forgiveness and Retribution, 30. 
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 Forgiveness, as the opposite of resentment, is also deeply tied to the moral order. The 
ability to forgive a gratuitous personal injury or insult begins with the recognition of the 
perpetrator as a moral agent, as Strawson believed. Strawson has contrasted the reactive attitude 
with an objective attitude, which he argues should preclude reactive attitudes such as resentment. 
Objectivizing others—not engaging with the other as a moral agent—indicates one is “not 
relating to the other as a fellow human…Being susceptible to anger and resentment is 
inextricably tied to participation in the general framework of human life.”35 As in the attitude of 
resentment, we must consider this person accountable—at the very least we must consider the 
offender to be a person. Margaret Holmgren has described these conditions: 
 
The cognitive component of an attitude of forgiveness includes an acute or salient 
awareness of the offender as a sentient being who is capable of experiencing happiness 
and misery…subject to various needs, pressures, confusions in life and is vulnerable to 
error…recognition that the offender is valuable human being with a moral status equal to 
our own…with the same basic capacity for growth, choice, and awareness that we 
have…in forgiveness we will have an experiential understanding of these salient features 
of the offender as a person and an appreciation of their overriding importance.36  
 
It is Holmgren’s argument that recognizing these features of the offender, which make the person 
an equal member of the moral community, should have “overriding importance,” that will 
become less clear and more contentious as I examine instances of potentially unforgivable 
instances of evil.  
 This discussion of the moral order is to elucidate that both possible responses to moral 
evil seem to require at least the recognition of the victim and the offender as morally responsible 
agents. Whether or not this understanding of moral agency indicates forgiveness is always 
virtuous and right, or whether it means resentment can be morally responsible is the complicated 
matter at hand.  
                                                
35 Brudholm, Resentment’s Virtue,11.  
36 Holmgren, Forgiveness and Retribution, 35. 
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Forgiveness: Social and Psychological Understandings 
 The significance ascribed to forgiveness and those who dispense it, as seen in the 
introductory story about Paco and his father, can only be understood in conjunction with an 
explanation of forgiveness as a virtue, beginning with the social, psychological, and 
philosophical reasons why it is regarded as virtuous.   
 Robert C. Roberts is the first to have ascribed a human virtue to the concept of 
forgiveness. Forgivingness, as Roberts calls it, is a trait embodied by those who “tend not to 
retain anger, bitterness, or resentment after being wronged.”37 This person overcomes the anger 
felt in response to injury, while not forfeiting his or her conviction that what was done was 
wrong. Overcoming anger and resentfulness requires time and thought, and replacing it with a 
more constructive and positive attitude.38 Forgivingness is a virtue because what it replaces is not 
a virtue; according to Roberts, anger, resentment, and persistent grievance are so destructive that 
the ability to surmount these feelings by way of a forgiving attitude is virtuous. Virtue ethics 
supposes that the possession of virtues, understood as deep and relatively permanent traits of 
character and intellect is a sign of moral worth; forgivingness operates then within the context of 
virtue ethics. The forgiving person does not seek revenge and will likely regard estrangement 
and antagonism as unnatural and undesirable. Forgiveness in this way is attuned with morality, 
integrity, a sense of justice, and self-respect, and to possess the virtue, a person needs skills of 
self-awareness and self-management.39  
 Roberts’ view represents the popular perception of forgiveness as not only a positive, 
constructive trait, but also as a virtue. There are virtue-laden traits and virtue-neutral ones, and 
the distinction between the two seems to have more to do with character and morality, and less to 
                                                
37 Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge, 45.  
38 Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge, 44. 
39 Ibid., 45 
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do with plain ability or proficiency. For instance, we would not say that the ability to parallel-
park a car is a virtue. It takes skill, but conceivably every person who can drive could learn to 
parallel park. We cannot say that the capacity to parallel-park a car is virtuous because everyone 
could learn if they took the time to do so. Labeling something as a virtue tends to conflate the 
notions of morality and virtuosity with the notions of inherency and disposition. Margaret 
Holmgren describes this as the relationship between attitudes and character traits: “attitudes 
become ingrained and internalized such that they form a regular response to a recurring situation 
and from this we can best understand character traits.”40 Virtues are types of traits that have 
moral weight.  
 The way Roberts has imagined it, forgiveness cannot simply be learned, and it cannot be 
separated from one’s character—either one espouses good morals, has integrity, and respects 
justice, or one does not. Similarly, honesty is widely considered to be a virtue, and we consider 
some people “honest” and others “liars” and these features mark their character. But we tend not 
to say someone is a bad person if he or she cannot parallel park. Roberts has taken forgiveness 
from the category of traits that includes parallel parking to the category of traits associated with 
honesty and integrity. The ability to forgive is now categorized as a virtue—and therefore 
charged with all that we associate with virtuosity.  
The social and psychological defenses of forgiveness typically assume one of the 
following positions: (a) that forgiveness is necessary for a society to progress and move forward, 
or (b) that forgiveness is therapeutic and thus desirable for both the victim and the aggressor. I 
will look at each of these cases for forgiveness in order to demonstrate how forgivingness has 
come to be accepted as a virtue.  
                                                
40 Holmgren, Forgiveness and Retribution, 26. 
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 Forgiveness has been associated with maintaining social order and fostering healthy 
relationships to others.41 Because one’s own humanity is ultimately and inherently tied to 
another, and because people consistently commit wrongs against others and are themselves the 
victims of wrongdoing, forgiveness is seen as the means by which estranged persons or 
communities are re-united, peace is restored, and the basic way in which humanity resists its own 
self-destruction. Archbishop Desmond Tuto has gone so far as to argue that without forgiveness, 
there will be no future—forgiveness is absolutely necessary.42 This is what Hannah Arendt 
meant when she described forgiveness as the only possible means of breaking the cycle of 
trespassing. According to Arendt, trespassing, or injury, is an unavoidable occurrence. The 
“mutual release,” as she calls it, from the bonds of what we have done is the only way that “men 
remain free agents, only by constant willingness to change their minds and start again.”43 Thus, 
idea of willingness arises, and the significance of our willingness, at least for Tutu and Arendt, is 
that it is critical for our future. Thus, those who are willing to lead us in forgiveness are 
considered the exemplars of virtuosity, perhaps because they have been able to carry out 
utilitarian ideals. We stand in awe of people like Nelson Mandela who forgive when they may 
not even know the perpetrator’s name, who forgive those who have wronged them in atrocious 
ways, and their forgivingness seems saint-like.44 Tuto has written of Nelson Mandela, “his 
forgiveness still leaves the world gasping at the sheer wonder of it…the magnanimity.”45   
 For some, forgiveness offers a way to break free of the captivity of the past. As 
mentioned above, the metaphysical fact that the past is irreversible makes it impossible to wipe 
the slate completely clean, tabula rasa. If forgiveness is not forgetfulness, and we cannot ever 
                                                
41 Escher, How Does Religion Promote Forgiveness?, 101.  
42 Tutu, foreword, xiii.  
43 Arendt, The Human Condition, 240. 
44 Wolfendale, The Hardened Heart, 348. 
45 Tutu, foreword, xiii.  
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forget past transgressions, people like Tutu have claimed that to forgive will result in freedom 
from the burden of the unalterable past. Without forgiveness, they argue, there is no “progress, 
no linear history, only a return to conflict and cycles of conflict.”46 
 The emphases on growth, moving forward, and letting go underlie the majority of non-
theological perspectives on the benefits of forgiveness. According to Paul Coleman, “forgiveness 
is more than a moral imperative…it is the only means, given our humanness and imperfections, 
to overcome hate and condemnation and proceed with the business of growing and loving.”47 
This brings us back to Paco and his father and the notion that our very humanness and 
imperfections necessitate forgiveness because it might be the only way we can restore 
relationships. We cannot reverse the past; we know that time only moves forward. But more 
importantly, our “humanness,” as Coleman calls it, makes us culpable. Volf uses the metaphor of 
a shark to explain this nicely: if a shark sees a surfer and mistakes her for a seal and takes a bite 
and destroys her leg, there is nothing (no one) for the surfer to forgive; the shark did what it 
naturally does, and it cannot be blamed for its action. According to Volf, the shark in this story 
has injured the surfer, but has not wronged her.48 So what does it mean to wrong and how does 
this relate to our humanness? Put simply, we are not sharks. We can be faulted for our 
wrongdoings and negligence—the deliberate acts that are imputable to us—this is a fact of our 
humanness.  
Coleman’s view represents the summation of what Arendt and Tutu are claiming. That is, 
forgiveness is not only morally commendable (and in Coleman’s eyes, required), but also there 
are practical forces at play. Because we all have the ability to forgive—we have cognition and 
rationality as moral agents—we need to be willing to forgive in order to maintain social order 
                                                
46 Helmick, introduction, xxvii.   
47 Helmick and Peterson, Forgiveness and Reconciliation, 387. 
48 Volf, Free of Charge, 129.  
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and carry on with life.  And because no person is perfect and we are burdened by our 
wrongdoings as they stick to us (unlike the shark), then we, along with the eight hundred Pacos, 
desire forgiveness in order for that burden to be lifted. Without forgiveness, so the argument 
goes, we will stall progress and threaten the stability of community. Recall the utilitarian 
argument that what is virtuous is what brings the greatest good to the greatest number, and we 
see how the notion of willingness is important. In order for society to flourish, we must give 
priority to the good that will come to the social order.  
Forgiveness is also given serious consideration in terms of its therapeutic benefits. It is 
viewed as a goal in psychotherapy, marital counseling, and group interventions.49 The notion of 
“letting go” has been of interest to psychologists, who take forgiveness to be a means of healing. 
Letting go implies that the victim’s life is no longer dominated by thoughts, memories, and 
negative feelings, and this escape from the negative emotions that linger after the injury is central 
to the weight placed on forgiveness by psychological research.50 Popularly, we might also 
observe that forgiveness is the focus of numerous self-help books, and the internet is rife with 
websites that collect quotes about forgiveness. In fact, among the top Google searches associated 
with the term “forgiveness,” are “forgiveness verses,” “quotes about forgiveness,” “quotes 
forgiveness,” “forgiveness lyrics,” and “forgiveness is.”51 Interestingly, forgiveness queries via 
Google reached their highest number over the past decade in February 2014. All of this is to say 
that questions about how to forgive, what influential people have said about forgiveness, and 
Biblical references to forgiveness are at the forefront of people’s minds. I have no doubt that its 
popular status as an unconditional good is related to its integration into therapeutic discourse.  
                                                
49 Cohen, et al., Religion and Unforgivable Offenses, 86. 
50 Enright and North, Exploring Forgiveness, 40.  
51 Google Zeitgeist 2013 
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Further, the “closure” assumed to come with forgiveness is attractive to many people.52 
Resentment is assumed to be an immense emotional burden that traps the victim in the moment 
of injury. The release of negativity that is the primary aim of forgiveness (understood as the 
overcoming of resentment) is clearly a strong motivation for those “trapped” we might say, by 
resentment. In fact, Everett Worthington, a psychologist who has dedicated much of his research 
to forgiveness, argues that the potential benefits of forgiveness are the most frequently and 
extensively documented aspect of the topic.53 Offering forgiveness is acclaimed as a result of its 
potential benefits, which seem to outweigh the emotional costs of withholding it. This is a classic 
utilitarian justification for a virtue—forgiveness is virtuous because the emotional benefits will 
bring us pleasure.  
 
Forgiveness and Christianity 
 Forgiveness has been encouraged for centuries by many world religions for its spiritual 
benefits and transformative power. Yet the theoretical models of forgiveness are relatively 
new—thus it seems critical to understand religious perspectives on forgiveness, as they are older 
than any sociological, psychological, or philosophical conceptualizations. Up until the mid-
1980s, most people associated forgiveness with religion—even non-religious people thought this 
way, as common culture has appropriated the term “forgiveness” from its religious context.54 
Several studies have found that religious strategies for forgiveness are most commonly cited, and 
that people who are more religious value forgiveness more than those who are less religious.55 
                                                
52 Murphy, Forgiveness, Self-Respect, and the Value of Resentment, 37. 
53 Worthington, More Questions About Forgiveness, 567. 
54 ——, The Art and Science of Forgiving, 2.  
55 Pargament and Rye, Religious Perspectives on Forgiveness, 18. These results are from a dialogue among  
religious scholars, answering questions about forgiveness generated by the researchers. I primarily focused on the 
responses of the Christian scholar, James G. Williams.  
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There seems to be a clear link between forgiveness and major world religions, but most of the 
existing research explores the central relationship between Christianity and forgiveness, so I will 
devote my analysis of religion and forgiveness to the Christian tradition and its teachings.  
Religious principles have included forgiveness in a number of ways. For one, forgiveness 
can be imbued with divine qualities, so that in theistic religions, to forgive is to imitate God, 
carry out God’s plan, or become closer to God.56  Christian parables provide figures that embody 
forgivingness (most notably, Jesus Christ), and provide the support of those who champion a 
worldview conducive to forgiveness, for injured parties processing an offense against them. 
 Another reason for focusing on Christianity is that it espouses a dominant (at least in 
American culture) set of principles that inform forgiveness. Daniel Escher has argued that there 
is a “socialization” by way of religious leaders, teachers, and community members, which 
facilitates the internalization of religious beliefs. These schemas of socialization “include a 
religious adherent’s internalization of certain moral directives about the necessity of 
forgiveness…reinforced in various religious rituals…or prayers.”57 As the dominant religious 
tradition in the West over the last two millennia, it seems important to understand the way the 
internalization of Christian beliefs has influenced popular perceptions of forgiveness.  
In the introduction, I briefly explained that repentance and forgiveness are fundamentally 
tied to Christian doctrine because of humanity’s inherent sinfulness as a result of the fall of 
mankind in the Book of Genesis, and I would like to now revisit this claim. The doctrine of 
original sin is an attempt to extend the history of sin from its beginning to modern humankind, a 
kind of “inherited corruption.”58 Original sin has yet to gain traction in religious studies 
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57 Escher, How Does Religion Promote Forgiveness?, 103.  
58 Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, 86. 
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scholarship on forgiveness, but I want to suggest that this doctrine plays an important role in the 
centrality of Christian and biblical concerns for forgiveness.  
The Judeo-Christian conception of sin is that while evil is not from God, God must be 
responsible in some way because nothing can be beyond God—this is the classic problem of 
theodicy. This tradition rejects the Gnostic suggestion of two Gods, and thus everything comes 
from one God, and nothing can be from another. Because the Christian understanding of God 
does not hold Him to be directly responsible for evil, we tend think of evil and sin as part of the 
received condition of humanity, inherited in the biblical fall from grace of Adam and Eve; we are 
at once guilty perpetrators and involuntary heirs of evil. What we are left with is a notion of sin 
and transgression as inexplicable, common, and unrelenting experiences, and with this, a 
syndrome of guilt This has been the foundation for Christian themes of repentance and reliance 
on God for salvation. 
One way of relating original sin to the greater discussion of forgiveness is that the fall of 
humankind has made humans dependent on God’s forgiveness and salvation. Adam’s 
disobedience demonstrates that humans are free to sin, so one implication may be that freedom 
leads to sinfulness. So we see a shift in conceiving freedom as just part of the human condition to 
viewing freedom as problematic to it. There is an increasing awareness of humanity’s corruption, 
and a reinforced notion of salvation as entirely dependent on God’s grace. Humanity views itself 
as Adam’s heirs, constantly being pulled down by the doomed heritage that Adam’s sin 
bequeathed to us—a situation from which only Christ can redeem us.59  
In an influential article on the topic, Hermann Häring has argued that original sin has 
been read less as an analogue to the present experience and challenge of evil, and more as the 
essential demise of human freedom. He explains, “the time of pernicious human freedom has 
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now run its course and the time of an obedience bringing salvation has begun…in this way the 
‘Christian’ story of the fall took on its specific contours.”60 Not only does the notion of inherent 
sin convey obedience (and demand repentance) but it also sets Christianity up to claim to have 
the solution to human guilt in ways that other traditions do not. The hopelessness of a constant 
sense of personal guilt (because no one is infallible) finally has a historical explanation, and at 
the same time, a response to it. The solution to the inevitable experience of sin has been 
“institutionalized and monopolized” by Christianity in this way.61   
Christ’s grace led to salvation and redemption, and while humanity is certainly culpable 
for its sins in some ways—legally, morally, emotionally—it seems as if wrongdoings are 
assumed to be givens, and importantly, so is forgiveness. It in part, places the origin of sin 
historically, making it a prominent factor for the human condition yet one that remains out of our 
hands. In other words: sin will happen, people will hurt one another, but Christianity has figured 
out a solution for that history, which is having faith in Christ, the savior. As opposed to the 
history of sin enduring, Christianity at once holds humanity responsible (and mandates 
repentance) and promises forgiveness (through faith); God offers forgiveness in exchange for 
repentance. Thus it has been argued that transgression and forgiveness are linked by the disorder 
and imbalance that result from sin—humanity cannot tolerate the chaos of sin, so forgiveness is 
implemented as a way to restore balance and order.62  
According to the Christian scholar James G. Williams in a study conducted by Kenneth 
Pargament and Mark Rye on the how religion influences the psychological processes of 
forgiveness, the act of forgiveness is often understood as 
                                                
60 Ibid., My emphasis to demonstrate the importance of the idea that obedience, or submission, is critical for 
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An act of pardon or release from an injury, offense, or debt. On the part of the forgiving 
subject, it entails having compassion, releasing someone from any act or attitude that 
would impede the relationship of those involved. On the part of the forgiving subject, it 
usually entails showing signs of repentance for the wrong done and acts of contrition and 
love, in keeping with the graciousness shown by the forgiver.63  
 
This definition does not seem very much different than some philosophical 
conceptualizations of forgiveness, except for two words: love and graciousness. These two words 
are what distinguish Christian understandings of forgiveness from psychological or philosophical 
or sociological understandings, because both “love” and “grace” are intimately tied to the 
Christian construction of God. The Christian God of love, who became human in the person of 
Jesus,64 enables the spirit and power of forgiveness in human beings through Jesus as the 
messiah.65 The Bible is rife with parables and lessons of forgiveness and serves as an important 
reference for Christians on the matter. From the cross, Jesus pleads for God’s mercy for his 
crucifiers in the ultimate Christian example of forgiveness: “Father, forgive them, for they do not 
know what they are doing.”66 Other references include the Lord’s Prayer—“forgive us our 
trespasses as we forgive them that trespass against us”—and in Matthew—“Then Peter came to 
Jesus and asked: ‘how many times shall I forgive my brother or sister who sins against me? Up 
to seven times?’ and Jesus answered, ‘I tell you, not seven times, but seventy-seven times.’”67 
And the Paco story calls to mind the parable of the Prodigal Son in Luke, when “His father saw 
him and had compassion.”68 
 Each of these passages refers the reader to the ideas of grace and love in order to inspire 
a forgiving spirit in those who strive to lead a Christ-like life. According to Williams, forgiving 
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65 Pargament and Rye, Religious Perspectives on Forgiveness, 25.  
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is at the heart of Christianity, for it “represents the possibility and reality of change and 
transformation of the individual in relation to others and others in relation to the individual.”69  
The notion that God is omni-benevolent, loves every person, and has allowed Christ to be 
the ultimate figure of graciousness and forgivingness seems to give Christians a firmly rooted 
worldview through which they can approach questions of forgiveness. While the morality of 
forgiveness certainly is not diminished in Christian theology, it is supplanted by a doctrine of 
unconditional love and grace as one strives to emulate Christ, imitatio Christi.  
The idea that we are created in the image of God has inspired Archbishop Tutu’s 
advocacy of forgiveness. He has expressed a long tradition of Christian thought when he argued, 
“Monstrous deeds do not turn the perpetrators into monsters. A human person does not 
ultimately lose his or her humanity which is characterized by the divine image in which every 
individual is created.”70 The common Christian phrase, “Love the sinner, hate the sin”71 echoes 
in Tutu’s claim. The theological framework for Tutu’s argument is clear: because we are created 
in God’s image, all human beings have the capacity for transformation and reconciliation—no 
person is reducible to his or her wrongdoings, and thus no person is beyond forgiveness. It is 
important to note that God does not just spare sinners the consequences of sin. Rather, the sin is 
separated from the sinner, and this is made possible by Christ’s unity with God and with 
humanity. Because Christ dies for humanity’s sins and is one with God and humanity, God can 
separate sinners from their sins.72   
                                                
69 Pargament and Rye, Religious Perspectives on Forgiveness, 31. 
70 Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge, 110.  
71 This phrase is not actually in the Bible, but we can  look to Romans 5:8 where it reads, “God demonstrates his 
own love for us in this: While we were still sinners, Christ died for us.” Many have interpreted this to mean, “love 
the sinner, and hate the sin” as Christ loved the sinner, while God condemns the sins.  
72 Volf, Free of Charge, 145. 
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 Another way in which Christianity influences the discourse of forgiveness addresses the 
problem posed by Coleman and Arendt, that our imperfections and weaknesses as human beings 
predispose us to an unavoidable cycle of wrongdoing. Recognizing each person’s own fallibility 
and inherent sinfulness, Christians are urged to forgive those who have injured them, because 
they will all need God’s forgiveness. Thus Christian rhetoric emphasizes humility and empathy: 
“we are going to need forgiveness, we are going to ask for it ourselves, and by these requests we 
are in effect recognizing that forgiveness is something good. Because we will seek God’s 
forgiveness we should be willing to grant forgiveness to those who seek it from us…[this is] a 
matter of felt, generalized, unconditional love.”73 The implication of this teaching is that 
Christians should forgive unilaterally. As a result, to resist forgiveness and be resentful is un-
Christian, and if one refuses to forgive others, he or she cannot expect forgiveness from God.  
 The Christian rhetoric of forgiveness then seems to operate from within the framework of 
Divine Command theory as I have argued at the outset. As a Christian virtue, forgiveness can be 
justified by Christian conceptions. According to Robert Downie, the Christian justification is: 
“‘Since your Heavenly Father has forgiven you, you ought also to forgive others'. In other words, 
forgiveness is justified as being a response to injury fitting in creatures who are themselves liable 
to error.”74  
This ethical context is also related to justice. The fifth petition in the Lord’s prayer—
“forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us”—illuminates something 
about why forgiveness is a Christian virtue related to justice. The relationship between God’s 
forgiveness and our forgiveness of others is related to Divine Command theory in the following 
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way: because God forgives the sins of humanity, and forgiveness is commanded by God75, then 
forgiveness counts as a virtue. The relationship is described nicely by William Mattison as “that 
our forgiveness of our neighbors, or lack thereof, suggests a standard or rule that we think 
represents the order of justice…and as Christ himself reminds us, ‘the measure with which you 
measure will in return be measured out to you.’”76 
One criticism employed by Trudy Govier in her discussion of religious traditions and 
forgiveness is that to ground an ethic and conceptualization of forgiveness on theological footing 
is difficult. She claims, “Although religious teachings offer rich resources for reflection, their 
variety and uncertainty mean that they cannot eliminate the need for secular reasoning, 
judgment, and reflection about the topic.”77 What she is arguing here is that theological doctrines 
and parables cannot provide adequate guidance in practical, human affairs—not least because of 
the variety of possible theories from different religious traditions. There are a few unanswered 
(and perhaps unanswerable) questions within the Christian tradition that I wish to explore 
further. 
  The notion of God’s forgiveness again arises in thinking about the expulsion or 
persistence of guilt after one has been forgiven. Even after we forgive, is guilt removed, or just 
anger? One could argue that someone is still guilty before the wronged person and/or God 
because thinking about forgiveness through a theological lens does not (and perhaps cannot) 
address the practical problem of guilt and blame. In other words, it is not clear that to forgive is 
necessarily to remove blame—at least not in the definition Butler and subsequent theorists in this 
paper have used. If to forgive, as Butler claimed, is to forgo revenge and resentment, then that 
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does not seem to necessarily remove guilt. This could have several implications from within the 
Christian perspective.  
We can imagine that an offender commits a wrong, and is punished, but the injured 
person is a devout Christian and, in the spirit of God-like forgiveness, forgives the offender. Yet, 
the offender remains guilty in the eyes of the law and perhaps the community and on official 
record, so the fact that he or she has been forgiven does not remove that type of guilt. And we 
can also imagine the inverse: a devout Christian offender is not punished by the law and faces no 
societal consequences like fines, imprisonment, or even public shame. The injured party (not a 
Christian, for the sake of argument) does not believe forgiveness is mandatory or appropriate and 
withholds forgiveness. In this case, the offender is not legally or socially guilty—he or she has 
not been punished—but does he or she remain guilty before God and in the eyes of the offender? 
Volf would argue that, indeed, the situation is complicated—for Christians, forgiving often takes 
place in a triangle of the offender, the wronged person, and God. “Take God away,” Volf argues, 
“and the foundations of forgiveness become unsteady and may even crumble.”78 Again, we are 
reminded of Divine Command Theory—the virtuosity of forgiveness is largely dependent on the 
fact that it is commanded by God. It has been argued that Jesus Christ, as God incarnate, “is far 
more than a great moral teacher. He was that, and his injunctions on forgiveness…are powerfully 
true rules for us in how to live our own lives.”79 
To be truly forgiven, sins are not just disregarded by God, but completely removed—the 
sin is separated from the sinner as Christian rhetoric has allowed for. Volf returns to this idea 
later when he writes, “As long as offenses stick to those who have committed them, the offenders 
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remain offenders, even if they are viewed as if they were not.”80 This notion is problematic if we 
keep in mind that humans are not sharks—we are accountable for our wrongs and remain guilty. 
Is blotting out the sin from the sinner turning humans into sharks? 
 
What forgiveness is not 
If we can concede that unconditional forgiveness (and forgivingness as the propensity to 
forgive) is popularly held to be a virtue—that is, something to which we attribute moral worth 
and regard as being tied to one’s character, we have only done part of the work in defining 
forgiveness.81 Forgiveness is a way of addressing problems caused by the wrongdoings of others 
and moving forward, but there are similar attitudes with which it might be confused. It should 
not be conflated with condoning or forgetting the wrongdoing. When I will suggest later that 
forgiveness is not virtuous in some particular cases, it will not be because I have equated 
forgiveness with condonation or forgetting. I agree with the proponents of forgiveness who 
would say that there is a critical distinction between forgiving an injury and justifying an injury. 
The very act of forgiving requires recognition of the act as wrong. Further, my argument against 
unconditional forgiveness is not based on a belief that to forgive is always to condone. 
My argument is against the idea that simply because one recognizes an injury as wrong, 
that in turn, forgiveness is unconditionally necessary or virtuous. On the contrary, it is not only 
unnecessary, but in some cases, dissolute and immoral. Yet in either case, the difference in the 
characteristics of what it means to forgive as opposed to what it means to forget or condone is 
worth explicating. 
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What are the differences between forgiveness and related notions? Pardoning, 
overlooking, condoning, and absolving all look like forgiveness in some ways, but there is 
something distinct about forgiveness that makes it resistant to being integrated with these 
associated concepts. Condoning is to agree to overlook a wrong that has been done, not to deny it 
(as in the case of excusing).82 Pardoning is similar in that it does not require the offender to 
admit any wrong. Pardoning, moreover, implies that the retribution or punishment is taken away, 
not the accusation itself. Berel Lang has argued that absolution is most frequently associated 
with religious forgiving, because it implies a literal and metaphysical ‘erasure’ of the past—
God’s absolution of humanity’s sins is unconditional.83 Absolution, then, has qualities of 
ultimate removal of sins, which cannot always be reconciled with interpersonal transgressions 
beyond the realm of Christian theology.   
Certain instances of forgiveness may resemble condoning, particularly when the person 
being forgiven cannot or does not articulate what his or her transgression was. Just because the 
wronged person and the offender recognize and understand the injury between them does not 
mean forgiveness should necessarily follow. As Trudy Govier points out in her book Forgiveness 
and Revenge, “we can understand acts without fully [forgiving] them.”84 The danger, I think, is 
when we forgive acts without fully understanding them. The danger of pardoning, condoning, 
absolving, and excusing evils committed against us comes when forgiveness is approached as a 
necessary or compulsory act—not as a conditional one.  
The familiar phrase “forgive and forget” may mislead us into thinking that forgivingness 
and forgetfulness somehow go hand-in-hand. Popular conceptions of forgiveness understand it as 
a means to freedom from the pressure of resentment on memory. Celebrity psychologist Dr. Phil 
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explains, forgiveness is “releasing yourself from anger, hatred and resentment…I’m not saying it 
is easy, only that it is necessary.”85 The person offering forgiveness does so in an attempt to free 
his or her mind from the negative emotions of the offense. One might argue that upon 
forgiveness, all is forgotten and thus overlooked, and the effects of condemnation are lifted from 
the offender as well—he or she no longer is burdened by the wrong. More importantly, the 
burdens of condemnation and the associated hurt, embarrassment, and indignation are lifted from 
the mind of the forgiver. On the contrary, even advocates of forgiveness have argued that 
forgiveness need not erase or disregard the wrong, at least in the offenses that go beyond 
ordinary transgressions.86 Condemnation is intertwined with forgiveness; condemnation is not 
forgotten when forgiveness is offered—rather, it is inseparable from the process. As Volf 
explains, “we accuse when we forgive,” and as I have argued above, the accusation does not 
disappear—that would be condonation, which forgiveness is not. In short, because condemnation 
runs inseparably through the act of forgiveness, the wrong need not (and perhaps cannot) be 
forgotten.  
Murphy raises an interesting point about the problematic nature of forgiving and 
forgetting—he argues that there is a lack of agency involved in the case of forgetting.87 
Forgetting—at least in the most literal sense—is non-voluntary. If Murphy is correct that there is 
no agency, be it moral or not, in forgetting, then to conflate forgetting with forgiving would not 
work. Forgiveness is a choice, but forgetfulness is not.  
This is not to say that because forgiveness is not forgetting or condoning that it is 
unconditionally virtuous and morally acceptable. It is to demonstrate that because we may only 
forgive what was initially appropriate to resent then resentment and forgiveness can only co-
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operate when the transgression remains integral.88 But, I will argue, even with the above 
understanding in mind, there are instances in which forgiveness is not appropriate.  
 
Unconditional forgiveness 
The type of forgiveness that I will argue is not and cannot be a virtue is that which 
diminishes our morality or the moral community. Forgiveness eo ipso might not yield this kind 
of result; only when it is unconditioned and unilaterally held to be a virtue is there a danger that 
it will compromise moral principles because there are no limits to its appropriateness. 
Unconditional forgiveness is understood here in the sense that it lacks limitations and 
stipulations about when it is the right moral choice. Very few virtues or traits can be understood 
categorically, or unconditionally; it is difficult to say anything is a “good” across all possible 
situations. Kant’s categorical imperative—that one could will his or her own maxims to be 
universalized—could be considered at this point. In order for unconditional forgiveness to be a 
virtue (under virtue ethics) it would be that which will always benefit the person who possesses 
forgivingness. I will argue this cannot be the case with unconditional forgiveness because in 
some cases, the forgiving attitude is morally wrong and not beneficial to the victim (or the moral 
community), and thus one should not will it to be a universal quality.  
My argument against unconditional forgiveness is that despite the forgiving attitude’s 
virtuous reputation, it cannot count as a virtue if it is morally problematic. There are times when 
it is appropriate to forgive, and times when it is appropriate to withhold forgiveness, and I cannot 
account for all possible situations where the decision between resentment and forgiveness is 
relevant, these will vary immensely. Given its nature as a deeply emotional and personal process, 
scenarios involving forgiveness and resentment will be nuanced. Nevertheless, I want to argue 
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that in any case, it is not moral to forgive if in the process we negate our own moral rights, or 
deny the moral rights of others. If forgiveness is unconditional and unquestioning—if it requires 
no consideration of principles of morality—then it cannot be said to be a virtue. What is in 
question for my evaluation is whether or not unconditional forgiveness is a virtue. In turn, I will 
show that it is conditional forgiveness which is commendable; only in its conditioned form could 
it be considered beneficial trait of the beholder.  
 
Conditional Forgiveness 
Fixed in my understanding of forgiveness is the notion that giving forgiveness is at the 
discretion of the person who has been wronged (or those affected by the injury), and its 
suitability is conditioned by the principles of morality: this is conditional forgiveness. When 
forgiveness can be aligned with self-respect, and respect of others and the integrity of the moral 
community, forgiveness is indeed a virtue. But the virtuosity of forgiveness is dependent on the 
conditions having been met. This is why unconditional forgiveness—which may or may not meet 
these conditions—cannot always ensure that forgiveness is a moral choice; forgivingness cannot 
be universally adopted as a positive, virtuous attribute. Because forgiveness always is put side by 
side with resentment—one can either adopt one attitude or the other—when the conditions for 
forgiveness cannot be met, then embracing resentment, rather than overcoming it, is a more 
virtuous response. It should now be clear that I am not suggesting that forgiveness should never 
be issued, or that it is never virtue. Rather, my position is that a more morally responsible 
approach to the subject would be to condition forgiveness upon certain principles, so that we can 
say only when these principles are met that forgiveness is moral or virtuous, and when they are 
not, the attitude is not a virtue. 
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 Because I want to show the way in which forgiveness is held as a virtue, and resentment 
as a non-virtue, and eventually argue that in some cases, these connotations may be reversed, it 
will be useful to start by understanding forgiveness and resentment in terms of their attitudes, 
their attributes, potential advantages and disadvantages, and accompanying perspectives.  
 
Resentment: Social and Psychological Understandings 
 According to Butler, “resentment towards any man hath plainly a tendency to beget the 
same passion in him who is the object of it; and this again increases it in the other,” and so goes 
the vicious cycle that Arendt was so weary of.89 It is in this manner that resentment is often 
viewed—an emotion that creates further problems rather than resolving the one in question. 
Resentment may be viewed as a sort of moral anger, the type of anger that is calculated and 
intentional rather than the result of a knee-jerk reaction. Butler characterized resentment as 
involving one’s cognitive faculties, more than just sensation, but “the effect of reason.”90  
 Resentment often functions on two levels. We resent the actions taken against us: this 
was morally wrong and should not have happened. We also resent the fact that it happened to us 
in particular: life is not fair. In either case, resentment is deeply tied to morality. It stands as a 
“testimony to the moral order,” according to Murphy, and invokes the concept of knowing right 
from wrong.91 A resentful person is therefore bitter both about his or her fate and misfortune and 
toward the offender. Resentment may become engrained in one’s attitude about the nature of the 
world. Ongoing resentment may “support a sense of rage and envy, an embittered sense that 
fundamentally one has been unjustly selected to be a victim, a generalized unhappiness with the 
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world, and an inability to move ahead in life.”92 For this reason, some psychologists have 
suggested that resentment is correlated with decreased satisfaction in life. Depression and 
anxiety have been listed among what we might call the “side effects” of bitterness.93 These 
claims about forgiveness reflect a utilitarian perspective: the process of forgiveness and its 
positive associations with happiness count toward forgiveness as a virtue because it brings 
pleasure to both the forgiver and the offender. Worthington claims, “It seems obvious that people 
who are unforgiving experience more anger and depression.”94   
A resentful attitude has also been associated with weakness, as Jean Hampton has argued. 
She suggests that resentment reflects insecurities: it is “an emotional defense against attacks on 
self-esteem,” but we only resent those who have the power to humiliate us.95 William Young 
expressed a similar point: resentment acknowledges that one feels that his or her worth depends 
on “how one is seen by others, a confession that one’s status can be successfully challenged by 
how one is perceived.”96 In other words, allowing oneself to become resentful implicitly affirms 
whatever the insult was. If it were not true, why not just laugh it off? Of course, one has to 
wonder how a theory like resentment is weakness would stand up in cases of great and pervasive 
evil, and later I will argue that a defense of forgiveness (and implicitly a rejection of resentment) 
on these grounds will fail. 
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Resentment and Christianity 
Christian doctrine regarding resentment appears to be less focused on the origins and 
consequences of resentful anger and more concerned with where the anger is directed.97 I will 
show that while the Christian tradition broadly rejects resentment and prizes forgiveness, it may 
be more sympathetic to anger than popular or psychological understandings of resentment. 
“Righteous anger,” as it is sometimes called,98 is suggested in Paul’s letter to the Ephesians: 
 Be angry, and don’t sin. Don’t let the sun go down on your wrath….Let him who stole 
 steal no more; but rather let him labor, working with his hands the thing that is good, that 
 he may have something to give to him who has need…. Let all bitterness, wrath, anger, 
 outcry, and slander, be put away from you, with all malice. And be kind to one another, 
 tenderhearted, forgiving each other, just as God also in Christ forgave you.99  
 
Paul’s commands here acknowledge the inevitably of anger and perhaps even a suggestion that 
one should be angry about certain things. This righteous anger can have transformative power if 
directed in a God-like way, and we are charged to channel our anger into the service of God 
rather than as a ground for perpetuating sin.100 It seems, then, that anger can be justified if it is 
used for the improvement of society. Why then do hatred and resentment necessarily need to be 
overcome by forgiveness? Why is resentment not a theological virtue?  
 The Christian answer to this is two-fold. First, we have a view that mirrors Butler’s 
understanding of excessive resentment and its dangers. Further, there is a more doctrinally 
located conception of God’s wrath and ultimate judgment that eliminates the compulsion (and 
suitability) of humans to harbor resentment.  
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 L. Gregory Jones makes an argument against resentment that resonates with Butler’s fear 
of excess. Recall that Butler feared gratuitous anger and hatred in the wake of injury—the 
superfluous tendency of resentment is what makes it problematic. For Jones, it is the frequency, 
not the amount, of resentment which is troubling. We do not need excuses, Jones argues, to hate 
or desire retribution; these urges are deeply sown within us. The effects of persistent anger can 
be debilitating, and Christians should look to the example of Christ, who does not return hate to 
his betrayers but instead reconciles with them.101   
 Resentment must also be examined in light of the Christian doctrine of salvation and 
God’s justice: 
Leave room for God’s wrath, for it is written, ‘Vengeance is mine; I will repay’ the lord 
says…Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good.102  
 
What does this tell us about the juxtaposition of human judgment to God’s judgment? The 
possibility of eternal justice takes the power to be wrathful out of human hands. The final justice 
meted out to our aggressors is in God’s hands, and the Christian injunction to love our enemies 
precludes us from using God’s eventual punishment of the offender as a justification for hatred 
in this life.103 There is a call to seek salvation of all persons, even those who have injured us—
this is our only task, and the fate of our enemies is not up to human reason. The command to 
“hope that all will be saved, and to pray and love others accordingly,” suggests that even if God 
will punish our wrongdoers, it would be wrong for us to validate hatred, “moral or otherwise, as 
normatively good response to sin or wrongdoing.”104 Despite these clear warnings against 
vengeance, I will suggest that perhaps there is room in Biblical teachings for the kind of 
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resentment that I believe is morally responsible, and that the Christian understanding of 
“righteous anger” might be more compatible with resentment than it has been treated.  
 
Defenses of Resentment  
  According to many thinkers like Young and Hampton, and even popularly, resentment is 
not regarded as enjoyable or constructive. I think even a defender of the resentful attitude could 
agree that resentment prima facie is not a pleasant experience—as an attitude it is surely not 
something many would choose, given other more pleasant attitudes to choose from. The other 
side of the coin, however, is that no one chooses to be wronged. I will now present some 
arguments by which we may see that in some cases resentment may be warranted.  
 Robert Solomon presents one such theory. Solomon has defended resentment by his 
understanding of it as a response to injury against the self. He has held the opposite view of those 
who understand resentment as weakness. In fact, Solomon regards resentment as “deeply 
philosophical;” it allows the resentful person to extract from his or her particular circumstances 
something about the wrongs of society in general, and in turn he or she will question those 
powers and institutions who have allowed such injustices to occur. Resentment is “the passion of 
justice denied,” used to “put the world in balance.”105  
 Resentment as a passion has been a sticking point for those concerned with the tensions 
around it. Jeffrie Murphy defends resentment by a direct refutation of what Butler has to say 
about the passions. Before we explore Murphy’s argument, we should revisit Butler’s 
understanding of resentment. According to his sermons, forgiveness is the foreswearing of 
resentment, but it should be noted that forgiveness is not forgetfulness. That is, for Butler, 
forgiveness is a choice to not seek revenge and is thus a morally commanded, God-pleasing 
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virtue. Forgetting is not a choice—it just happens. Butler reasoned that forgiveness is the 
virtuous choice, because resentment will result in undesirable consequences. Resentment, to 
Butler, when it extends beyond the useful form of reinforcing moral norms and rules, “as human 
weakness and vanity typically allow it to, it becomes counterproductive and even seriously 
harmful to the social fabric.”106 These excesses of the passions of resentment are what Butler 
thinks we will avoid by adopting a forgiving attitude.  
Using Butler’s argument as a backdrop, Murphy argues that resent is a response to a 
wrong against the self, and thus the chief value of resentment is preservation of self-respect. He 
links the notion of personhood to resentment in an interesting way: following his argument that a 
person who does not resent a moral wrong against oneself lacks self-respect, he claims 
resentment is a “good thing, for it is essentially tied to a non-controversially good thing—self-
respect.”107 Indeed, using self-respect as a lens through which the virtues and vices are viewed 
changes the picture. A person who is quick to forgive might lack self-respect. Having Strawson’s 
“reactive attitude” is indicative of a person’s cognizance of his or her own rights and worth. The 
consequences of disregarding self-respect in the name of making amends could have dire 
consequences—perhaps worse than Butler’s excess of passions. Murphy explains this well: 
  Forgiveness may indeed restore relationships, but to seek restoration at all cost— even at 
 the cost of one’s human dignity—can hardly be a virtue. And, in intimate relationships, it 
 can hardly be true love or friendship either—the kind of love and friendship that Aristotle 
 claimed is an essential part of the virtuous life. When we are willing to be doormats for 
 others, we have, not love, but rather…‘morbid dependency.’108    
  
I will ultimately follow Murphy in my understanding of resentment, in that it is justified  
when self-respect, and a respect for the rules of morality, are at stake. 
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 Joram Graf Haber, in his book Forgiveness, also wrestles with the question of resentment 
and devotes almost half of book to the ethics of resentment. In building a defense of resentment 
as a virtuous concept, Haber believes we must first concede that resentment has a “bad 
reputation,” one that is undeserved. According to Haber, it is not resentment that is intrinsically 
immoral or wrong: it is “in excess, misplaced, or vindictive” circumstances.109 And, in order for 
resentment to count as something virtuous, Haber aptly argues that it must have beneficial effects 
on character. Echoing Murphy, Haber claims that an absence of resentment, when it is warranted, 
demonstrates a lack of self-respect. And thus, because “it is better to be self-respectful than it is 
to be servile, the possession of this quality is beneficial to its owner.”110 In other words, a 
disposition to resent when it is warranted is virtuous because the person is affirming respect for 
himself or herself.  
 It should be noted that Haber, Murphy, and eventually I defend resentment in cases when 
it is morally warranted—not to be confused with the popular understanding of resentment or the 
resentful personality. What typically comes to mind is the begrudging, stubborn person unwilling 
to forgive unilaterally and disposed to resent under all circumstances. It is commonly held that 
the resentful person will ultimately inflict self-harm, “like a scorpion stinging itself to death with 
its own tail.”111 We might all agree that resentment, in that way as it is commonly perceived, is 
not virtuous; but I will argue that when resentment is profoundly and truly necessitated by moral 
injury, we should not be so quick to abandon it in favor of forgiveness.  
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Unforgivable Evils 
Given that I have provided a general picture of forgiveness and resentment, a question 
arises: is it morally appropriate to forgive the perpetrator of a certain type of evil? This kind of 
evil, which I will argue is unforgivable, is the kind that detracts from someone else’s 
personhood, that which attempts to devalue someone’s humanity and regard them as lesser. 
Jessica Wolfendale calls this kind of evil dehumanizing.112 Of course, not all evils and not all 
transgressions are categorically dehumanizing—typically interpersonal forgiveness deals with 
relatively minor injuries (or minor evils, even) that we would not consider to be dehumanizing. 
To be sure, all acts of wrongdoing convey a certain message about the victim’s value as we saw 
in my earlier discussion of moral injury; but according to Wolfendale, “acts of dehumanizing 
evil communicate a particularly abhorrent version of this message.”113 These evils say something 
about a person being inferior, usually because they are of a certain social, racial, ethnic, or 
religious group. The victims may be targeted because they are women, Jews, homosexuals, 
African Americans, etc. A complete abandon of respect is at play.  
The issue of unforgivability arises with regard to instances of evil that prompt not only 
insult or humiliation, but also outrage. The scale of these acts can be large—inflicted on entire 
groups of people—a crime against humanity such as the atrocities of the Holocaust. But it may 
also be as small as having affected one person—the torture of one person. Some injuries, 
according to Griswold, “may be so profound that it seems humanly impossible…that resentment 
should be sent away.”114   
Others have thought about unforgivability in relation to the perpetrator. Cheyney Ryan 
has argued that unforgivable evils destroy hope, to the extent that we no longer believe anything 
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positive could happen; because children and infants represent hope and promise, evils where 
young people are affected are especially offensive to us.115 In Ryan’s view, the crime is 
inseparable from the person—a perpetrator of such hope-crushing evil is also hopeless. We 
cannot believe this person is capable of good. Mark Goulden also draws a hardline of 
unforgivability, he has claimed the nature of the crime marks the offending agent as 
unforgivable. The human mind, he says, is incapable of “comprehending the magnitude and 
mathematics” of cases such as sending children to Nazi gas chambers.116 For Gouldon, some acts 
are just too evil to forgive the person who committed them.  
Unforgiveable evils are directly related to moral injuries. There are moral injuries that are 
insulting, and then there are those that are intentionally degrading. That is, in certain cases of 
degrading, dehumanizing moral injury, the evil is unforgivable because to forgive would be an 
indication that one lacks self-respect. Glen Pettigrove has argued that to forgive such a wrong 
“communicates to the wrongdoer and to the community that one is not deserving of respect.” 117  
The question of unforgivability is especially complicated when we ask who has the 
power to forgive. Forgiveness unquestionably belongs to the injured (or so is the consensus of 
the literature on forgiveness), but what about cases when the injured are dead and thus incapable 
of doing so? Goulden attempts to answer this question by arguing that if the dead cannot forgive, 
then neither can the living.118 The only appropriate response in that case would be lack of 
forgiveness.  
For Volf, the power to forgive is related to Christian theology—God has already forgiven 
humanity, and thus we have the power to forgive others. But power and right are distinct, at least 
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for Volf, and the issue of right is related to self-respect. Volf conceives of moral law as being 
greater than one’s own set of self-governing rules. Rather, moral law is what binds us and ties 
members of a community together.119 This is significant because if this is true, then the offender 
has not wronged just one person, but the moral law is broken and thus the entire community is 
affected. Nevertheless, power may be one of the greatest obstacles to forgiveness even if we 
have the right: 
It’s the worry that, even if we had as much goodness and inner strength as Jesus  
 did on the cross, and even if wrongdoers did their part eagerly, for us mere humans, 
 forgiveness might still be both impossible and inappropriate.120  
 
Arguments against the unforgivable  
Perhaps the greatest opposition to the notion that there are unforgivable evils is the notion 
that the wrongdoer is an individual, separate from his or her wrongdoings. Govier has articulated 
a clear objection to the basic notion of unforgivability: 
 “Grant that some acts are utterly inexcusable and profoundly wrong. Grant that  
 such acts are monstrous, brutal, gross, horrifying, and atrocious. Grant that such  
 acts should never be excused, justified, or condoned. Grant that we should forever  
 decry their immorality and that their heinous nature should be recorded in human  
 history never to be erased. Grant that victims should be honored in memory and 
 survivors respected...Whatever they have done, and however much we may be 
 tempted to refer to them as “monsters,” “madmen,” or “rotten,” the fundamental  
 fact remains: perpetrators are human beings and our fellow creatures. They are  
 persons with a capacity for moral reflection and transformation, and we should  
 treat them accordingly.”121   
 
Govier’s argument reveals a popular criticism against unforgivability. Underlying her claim, of 
course, is the popular adage: hate the sin, and love the sinner. It is true that even though a person 
does not become his or her act—the agent is of course distinct from the action (metaphysically, 
at least)—but there is a sense in which the act becomes irremovable from how we evaluate the 
                                                
119 Volf, Free of Charge, 198.  
120 Ibid., 194. 
121 Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge, 112.  
47 
 
 
 
perpetrator’s character. I will argue that a person’s moral capacity is diminished in accordance 
with the execution of some atrocious evils; the act is intrinsically related to the wrongdoer.  
Jean Hampton has also considered the relationship of a perpetrator to his or her act, and 
argued that the call to love our enemies has definite religious undertones. Hampton, along with 
Govier, holds that it is possible to retain hatred of an agent’s deeds and still feel compassion for 
the individual. She imagines that Jesus, in his command to love our enemies, “is telling us that 
such compassion is always possible.”122 In response, however, I would argue that while 
compassion may be possible, that does not necessarily make it morally responsible or virtuous to 
exercise it.  
Hampton makes what appears to be a compelling argument that God the “father,” 
demonstrates this kind of compassion for humanity, as any parent regards his or her child as 
inherently good.123 It is precisely the parental belief in unconditional goodness that I object to 
because this line of reasoning leads to unconditional forgiveness, which I will argue is not 
always a virtuous choice. To believe that the agent is distinct from the act does not seem 
inherently wrong, in fact it may even seem innately right, until we see that to separate the two 
will allow for unconditional forgiveness. 
 Wolfendale has warned against “freezing” the perpetrators character in this way we are 
reapplying the original dehumanizing attitude of the offender—the victim was reduced to his or 
her gender, skin color, or religion and now the perpetrator is reduced to his or her act.124 I want 
to argue, however, that there is a distinction between the first outlook of the perpetrator and the 
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morally inferior is both morally wrong and dangerous because of the kinds of wrongdoing it can lead to, then that 
provides a strong reason to attempt to eradicate such beliefs within ourselves.”  
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outlook of the unforgiving victim. In the first case the perpetrator does not have grounds for 
believing and acting upon the notion that the victim is inherently inferior—race, gender, religion, 
sexual identity—since these are (or should be) irrelevant to the assessment another person’s 
worth. Conversely, the perpetrator has acted in a way that has diminished his or her own 
character, and consequently there are grounds (based on the act) to judge this person accordingly.  
  Wolfendale and Govier would argue that to concede that the offender has the possibility 
for change, the “capacity for moral reflection and transformation,” is what is important. 
Wolfendale writes, “The object of the [unforgiving] attitude is dehumanized because they are 
denied recognition of and respect for the essentially human capacity for rational moral 
agency.”125 In other words, by not recognizing the perpetrator as a person with equal propensity 
to change and become better, we risk becoming bound to the cycle of dehumanization.   
This line of reasoning presents an opportunity to go into more depth about the kind hatred 
associated with unforgivable evils, and the specific instances wherein I believe forgiveness is not 
virtuous, based on my understanding of virtuosity as related to that which will be part of the 
good life, and that which could be willed to be universally applied. Introducing these conditions 
will address further the above objections to the notion of unforgivability, as I offer an account of 
particular circumstances under which forgiveness and the moral hatred provoked by 
dehumanizing evil, are incompatible.   
 
When should we withhold forgiveness?  
 In its simplest form, my argument is that when forgiveness does not align with principles 
of self-respect and respect for others, it should be withheld. This section will explore the times 
when forgiveness is not virtuous in order to show that in some cases, resentment is just as 
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virtuous if not more virtuous than forgiveness. Some evils obliterate the possibility for 
forgiveness without disregarding self-respect or respect for others. These acts typically (though 
not always) involve remote offenders or have rendered those whom they have directly affected as 
incapable of offering forgiveness.  
 Forgiveness of dehumanizing acts of evil is that which is least compatible with self-
respect and respect for others. The kind of evil that reduces a person’s humanity produces what 
Jean Hampton calls “moral hatred” in the wronged person. Moral hatred expresses aversion to 
the (im)moral content of not just the immoral cause the action upholds, but also the person’s 
character who committed the wrong, as this person is taken to be identified with the cause.126 In 
other words, the offender is associated with the evil cause, and the hatred from the victim is 
based on an inability to separate immoral cause from immoral person. To be clear, I do not see 
this inability as a fault of the injured person; rather it demonstrates a justified resistance to 
accepting the idea that a moral person could perpetrate a profoundly immoral wrong. The 
offender, by association with the evil imbedded in his or her wrong, is believed “to have ‘rotted’ 
or ‘gone bad’ so that his or her goodness has in some increment diminished.”127  
The type of hatred Hampton describes is directly related to the notion of dehumanizing 
evil. It might be what one feels toward Adolf Hitler, or to a lesser but similar degree toward 
Myra Hindley of the Moors Murders in England—someone whose “goodness” seems 
irredeemably tarnished. Is it possible to believe these people have any decency remaining in 
them? Can we separate agent from act as Wolfendale would have it? Of course, one might 
believe that a person has some decency left—perhaps the person has apologized and displayed 
remorse—but still one might not expect enough is left to make it possible to forgive. In a way, 
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we are continually left facing Arendt’s metaphysical problem, that the past simply cannot be 
undone. This sounds awfully bleak, so I wish to reiterate that this special kind of judgment and 
moral hatred is reserved for particularly extreme and atrocious evils.  
 It is, of course, difficult to determine someone else’s moral capacity. The eminent 
Christian injunction to “love thy enemy” suggests we should have faith in the inherent goodness 
of humanity, though that is the kind of unconditional forgiveness that I question. Hampton, 
otherwise a champion of forgiveness, in a moment of candidness it seems, has echoed my 
concern with the kind of unconditional forgiveness put forth in Christian doctrine: 
Perhaps God can find enough good in certain highly immoral individuals I have known
 to forgive them and wash away their crimes, but I confess to finding it beyond me. This 
 confession may place me outside the proper sphere of Christian faith and charity; if so, 
 then [I] for moral reasons cannot sustain the charity this religion would require. 
 (Hampton 153).  
 
 Hampton’s confession will be useful in expounding what could possibly be a tension 
between the Christian doctrine of forgiveness and the notion of unconditional forgiveness. Is it 
possible to love our enemies in such a God-like gesture of grace? Even if God can maintain hope 
in a person’s moral capacity after grave acts of evil (unconditionally), it may well be beyond our 
own aptitude to maintain faith in every person’s decency. Interestingly, my view may have 
support from within the tradition itself.  
 There seems to be ambiguity from within Christianity about the place of moral hatred. In 
Matthew, Christ utters the eminent order to “love your enemy and pray for your persecutors”128 
But what about the incident earlier in Matthew when Christ berates the scribes: “Woe unto you,” 
he cries, “For ye are like unto white-washed sepulchers, which outwardly appear beautiful, but 
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inwardly are full of dead men’s bones.”129 It is unclear what Jesus meant by this, but there could 
be a relationship between being filled with “dead men’s bones,” and being morally dead. 
 Now that I have discussed moral hatred and its relationship to forgiveness, I will more 
closely examine the three instances where I believe forgiveness must necessarily be withheld: 
when it is incompatible with self-respect; when it is incompatible with respect for others; and, 
finally, when the offender is either unapologetic or inaccessible. 
 
1. Self-respect 
Murphy is particularly concerned with the relationship of the forgiving attitude to self-
respect. “Proper self-respect,” according to Murphy, “is essentially tied to the passion of 
resentment.”130 If proper self-respect is tied to resentment, it would seem that forgiveness would 
never be compatible with self-respect. Yet to understand that claim in this way is too superficial 
an understanding of his argument and would not serve to support my case. Murphy’s understands 
self-respect to be paramount when one considers the two options available after injury: 
resentment or forgiveness. Forgiveness, according to Murphy: 
   
…heals and restores…what would be the consequences of never forgiving? Surely it 
would be the impossibility of ever having the kind of intimate relationships that are one 
of the crowning delights of human existence. The person who cannot forgive is the 
person who cannot have friends or lovers…[but] not to have resentment when our rights 
are violated is to convey—emotionally—either that we do not think we have rights or that 
we do not take our rights very seriously. Forgiveness may indeed restore relationships, 
but to seek restoration at all cost—even at the cost of one’s very human dignity—can 
hardly be a virtue.131  
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We can take Murphy’s emphasis on the relationship between self-respect and dealing with moral 
injury as a means for understanding why forgiveness would be inappropriate if it abandons self-
respect.  
Conditional forgiveness, as I have argued, is the kind of forgiveness which does not 
compromise dignity in the process of restoring a relationship. Murphy has nicely summed up his 
argument that resentment protects self-respect. But I wish to take this further and discuss why 
self-respect and forgiveness of certain types of evil are incompatible, and why resentment is a 
more virtuous response when one’s self-worth has been compromised.  
Murphy conceives of moral injury to be a direct violation of one’s rights,132 and again, 
Wolfendale imagines this to be “dehumanizing evil,” the injury which degrades one’s 
personhood. Both types of injury involving self-respect transcend mere indignation or 
embarrassment. The kind of evil to which I am referring is a severe affront to one’s self-worth, 
and I one that I argue renders forgiveness morally inappropriate. A suitable example might be the 
case of a female rape victim. This type of aggression goes beyond demeaning, and the offender 
has made a statement, through his actions, about the victim’s worth. The offender has robbed the 
victim of a fundamental part of her personhood, and this could lead her to internalize the injury 
and feel herself degraded. In addition to any physical harm done, the offender has also 
communicated something about his estimation of her worth, and this could have a significant 
impact on the victim’s psyche.133  
In the wake of the injury, the victim of rape will likely experience the kind of moral 
hatred explained above. That is, the offender—in the victim’s eyes—has also lost something 
about his personhood. His act is thoroughly tied to an immoral cause—that women, or others in 
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general, are mere sexual objects, less valuable, and can be treated as such—and because the 
offender and the immoral content of his offense are inseparable, forgiveness would be immoral. 
Moreover, we might imagine the victim to be familiar with her aggressor—perhaps he is 
a friend, relative, or even a lover. As Murphy has argued, popular perceptions of forgiveness 
hold that it is the key to restoring relationships. But in cases like rape, we might ask: at what 
cost? Can we say that the benefit of having this relationship restored and healed outweighs the 
cost of accepting an injury that has attempted to diminish her personhood? It is also conceivable 
that the offender was a stranger. But even still, without the complications of restoring a personal 
relationship, forgiveness remains immoral. In this case, the attitude of resentment will 
demonstrate one’s position that this treatment is wrong and perhaps facilitate the victim’s 
process of reclaiming the dignity unjustly stripped from her.  
 In this way, we can see how unconditional forgiveness cannot capture the problematic 
nature of forgiveness in a case where one’s self-worth has been diminished. Forgiveness, 
unqualified, would hold the rapist to be worthy of forgiveness. But to attempt to separate the 
deed from the wrongdoer would be to ignore the immorality of the offender, and I cannot see the 
virtue in that. Unconditional forgiveness would say all persons are worthy of forgiveness—
forgiveness should be a universal maxim—but it cannot account for the instances where 
forgiveness would not be beneficial for the person dispensing it. If it is not beneficial, according 
to virtue ethics, it is not a virtue. Of course, if there is a way to forgive the offender without 
compromising the victim’s self-worth, then forgiveness would be a virtuous attitude. However, I 
do not see how this is possible, and therefore resentment must be the proper response. Only 
resentment can defend self-respect.  
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2. Respect for others  
 Another case in which forgiveness would be immoral is to turn the other cheek in a way 
that will perpetuate and reaffirm the evil. I have argued that forgiveness is related to that which 
could initially be resented, and I have questioned what this means for those who are indirectly 
affected by the wrong. In this section I will argue that there are instances when forgiveness could 
be offered (and thus withheld) by a person or group not directly affected, but affected insofar as 
they have a desire for justice and punishment prevail. 
 I have in mind cases where the injury is in fact an injury to humanity—not just one 
particular person or family, but rather—the kind of evil that shakes the foundation of the moral 
community at large. The destruction of hope, as Cheyney saw it, causes suffering not only for the 
direct victim(s), but also for secondary and indirect victims as well. Moreover, the kind of act I 
regard as unforgiveable tends to be the kind of wide-spread or monumentally atrocious one that 
affects an entire nation, race, generation, or even all of society. It is difficult in these situations to 
“gain a sense of the wrongdoer as a person, hard to comprehend how anyone could do such 
things…thus it is much harder to feel empathy with, or compassion for, the offender.”134  
 While it may be true that secondary and indirect victims—those not immediately affected 
by the wrongdoing—may not have the standing (or physical ability) to forgive the offender in the 
sense of saying I forgive you, I will argue it is necessary for them to take a moral position on the 
matter, manifest in the attitude of resentment. Because the act was so appalling that it can be 
counted as a societal injury, respect for others—respect for the integrity of the moral 
community—must be paramount when evaluating such acts. The Holocaust, and the internment 
and mass murders of six million Jews, is the uncontested example of this kind of evil. But I fear 
to expound an argument based on the monstrous deeds executed by the Nazis deserves more 
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complete treatment than I can possibly give it here. For the sake of brevity and clarity, I will use 
a fictional example, but one that will, I hope, clearly demonstrate the importance of respect for 
others in the moral community as a condition for the morality of forgiveness.  In the following 
example, to forgive—to overcome one’s hatred of the act and disregard the threat this would 
pose to the moral community—would be wicked, if not more wicked, than the original evil.  
 In Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, Ivan Karamazov recalls a graphic and 
troubling story of the death of an innocent child:  
 
One day a serf-boy, a little child of eight, threw a stone in play and hurt the paw of the 
General's favorite hound. ‘Why is my favorite dog lame?' He is told that the boy threw a 
stone that hurt the dog's paw. 'So you did it.' The general looked the child up and down. 
'Take him.' He was taken—taken from his mother and kept shut up all night. Early that 
morning the general comes out on horseback, with the hounds, his dependents, dog-boys, 
and huntsmen, all mounted around him in full hunting parade. The servants are 
summoned for their edification, and in front of them all stands the mother of the child. 
The child is brought from the lock-up. It's a gloomy, cold, foggy, autumn day, a capital 
day for hunting. The general orders the child to be undressed; the child is stripped naked. 
He shivers, numb with terror, not daring to cry… 'Make him run,' commands the general. 
'Run! Run!' shout the dog-boys. The boy runs…'At him!' yells the general, and he sets the 
whole pack of hounds on the child. The hounds catch him, and tear him to pieces before 
his mother's eyes…Well—what did he deserve?      
 ‘Shoot him!’ Alyosha said.135  
 
 What can Alyosha’s response tell us about the nature of unforgivability? It is important to 
note that his desire to “shoot him” should be taken here to represent a general inability to 
overcome hatred and not a suggestion that resentment is the same thing as retribution. The 
General, by the fundamentally immoral nature of his act, is indelibly marked by it. And Alyosha 
is not in a position to go to the General and offer forgiveness (or claim to withhold it). His 
response represents a respect for the shared principles of basic morality that form the 
underpinnings of the moral community, and thus reluctance—perhaps even an inability—to 
overcome that hatred. Merilys Lewis has argued that this is a “powerful moral protest against 
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innocent suffering, against the irreducible and unjustifiable evil in human life…she has no right 
to forgive the torturer for that even if her child were to forgive him.”136 Proponents of resentment 
hold that there can be something villainous and despicable about someone who would deny the 
resentful response to certain crimes.137  
 
3. The Unapologetic 
 The final instance in which I believe it is necessary to withhold forgiveness is in the case 
of the unapologetic offender. It is easy to imagine that when the offender is unrepentant that 
offering forgiveness could be construed as condoning or overlooking the injury, reducing the 
whole process to “letting go.” And, because I have argued that inherent in forgiveness is the 
condemnation of a wrong, if the unapologetic offender refuses to satisfy the condition that the 
injury is acknowledged as wrong, then forgiveness should be off the table.  
We might wonder what consequences this will have for the injured person. Has he or she 
been burdened further by the aggressor’s unwillingness to repent? Assuming for now that the 
offender is alive and able to offer repentance if only he or she was willing, it would be morally 
irresponsible to offer forgiveness. Consider again the rapist. If he refused to admit what he did 
was wrong, we can again take the evil nature of his deed to be a reflection of a defect or 
deficiency in his morality. I argued above that forgiveness and resentment both require that the 
transgression remains integral to forgiveness. Without an understanding that the act was wrong, 
and should not be repeated, we cannot expect the conditions of self-respect and respect for the 
moral community to be satisfied.  
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 The offender cannot be forgiven if the injured party bears in mind the principles of self-
respect—there is a lack of evidence that the wrongdoer has the capacity, or willingness, to 
change. In a situation where the offender has experienced no “change of heart,” then to restore 
the “moral relationship that existed prior to the injury would be to accept the wrongdoer qua 
offender into a relationship of moral equality.”138   
To offer forgiveness where none has been asked for is to reduce forgiveness to a 
psychological need to “let go” of the burden of resentment.139 This release may feel like 
forgiveness; the injured parties might believe they have done themselves a favor, but they have 
not forgiven—this could only be a pretense of forgiving, for there was no one to forgive!  
 The injunction to forgive an unapologetic person might be based on a fundamental belief 
that all people are good, or that the offer of forgiveness may inspire contrition, or that it will 
make us feel better. Religious notions of “faith” suggest faith allows the injured “to admit the 
behavioral evidence is against decency, but to ‘believe in’ the wrongdoer’s decency anyhow.”140 
But is this self-deception not a blatant form of self-disrespect? The forgiveness offered out of 
such faith is based more on hope than it is on fact, and because it sets aside self-respect in the 
name of “feeling better” or “letting go;” no matter how therapeutic it may be, how virtuous is 
this kind of forgiveness? It cannot be said that any hurdle has been overcome, that any work has 
been done in order to overcome hatred and resentment in a meaningful and lasting way. In this 
way, forgiveness seems no more virtuous than forgetfulness. The virtuosity of forgiveness hinges 
on the power of forgiveness to overcome transgressions, so long as it allows the forgiver to 
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maintain self-respect and respect for others. Otherwise, as I have shown, resentment should 
persist.  
If an injured person forgives the unrepentant in order to avoid the problem or move on 
quickly, he or she is self-defeating. Not only is his or her change of heart not likely to last,141 but 
also the wrongdoer does not have a right to our forgiveness. Despite plenty of arguments to the 
contrary, forgiveness is not a gift,142 nor is it a right of the offender to receive forgiveness. The 
virtuosity of forgiveness is undermined when agency (or work) is removed in offering 
forgiveness; there was no obstacle of repentance or resentment for either party to overcome. 
There does not seem to be anything virtuous about forgiving someone who is not remorseful; at 
best, this is mere catharsis, and at worst, it is collusion with the wrong itself.  
 
Counter arguments 
It might be suggested that to withhold forgiveness when the act of forgiving would 
compromise the victim’s self-respect does not account for the ways in which forgiveness could 
be enacted without a return to the status quo. The argument claims that it is possible “to forgive 
and, at the same time, remove oneself from a relationship in which one expects to suffer future 
harms.”143 If forgiveness, as suggested by Glen Pettigrove, is not tied necessarily to 
reconciliation, then there must be room for forgiveness without restoring whatever relationships 
were damaged.  
                                                
141 Hampton (ibid) remains skeptical about “changes of heart” in the victim about the character of the offender .She 
claims moral hatred is likely to “resurface at some point, perhaps damaging any renewed relationship which the 
purported forgiveness made possible.  
142 Volf (Free of Charge, 59) makes the argument that forgiveness is a gift, first from God to humanity, and as 
humans striving for a Christ-like existence, we should also give as God gave to us. “God has given to us so that we 
would share with others…we are not just the intended recipients of God’s gifts; we are also their channels.” I 
disagree with Volf that beyond a theological context forgiveness can be perceived as a gift—I do not think the 
victim of a dehumanizing, moral injury must bestow the gift of forgiveness upon an unrepentant offender.  
143 Pettigrove, Forgiveness and Love, 122. 
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 This argument returns us to the problem of “letting go,” or that the entire virtuous process 
of overcoming resentment can be reduced to the psychological desire to alleviate the burden of 
anger. This is undoubtedly primary in the motivations to forgive, and I would not dispute that 
there is truth to Pettigrove’s claim—particularly when the wrongdoer is remote (i.e., 
unreachable, imprisoned), when the offender was a stranger (i.e., rapist), or when a group 
committed the injury (i.e., Nazis). 
 But my argument is based on the virtue, not the therapeutic value, of forgiveness. 
Forgiving someone when reconciliation is not possible or desired may be of immense 
psychological value, but can we say that it is virtuous? The reasons one arrives at emotional 
relief are important. Jesse Couenhoven has argued that moral concerns—not the mere 
instrumental ones—give the proper context for forgiveness.144 In other words, if the reasons one 
forgives are merely instrumental (therapeutic), then the outcome may look like forgiveness, but it 
is in fact taking forgiveness to be less than what it really is. The virtuosity of forgiveness seems 
to stem from the moral and ethical effort put into overcoming resentment and demanding self-
respect. Pettigrove’s argument addresses the kind of forgiveness that is “letting go” or “moving 
on,” and thus it is unable to account for virtuous nature of unconditional forgiveness.  
Withholding forgiveness because it would be immoral to the moral community is not 
based on a misunderstanding of forgiving as condoning. Those who argue this have questioned 
the belief that being unforgiving is the only way to condemn the injury.145 However, I have 
already pointed out the possible confusion about what forgiveness is by explaining that it is not 
pardoning, excusing, or condoning, and that the transgression must remain central to the process. 
I agree with Wolfendale that unforgiving is not the only way to condemn the wrong, but I 
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disagree that this somehow counts against the unforgivable attitude as a more virtuous response 
in some cases. The idea that it is immoral to forgive certain evils, particularly when the laws of 
the moral community are at stake, is not about showing condemnation; it is based on an inability 
to separate the (im)moral content of the act from the perpetrator.  
In other words, to say the only purpose of withholding forgiveness is to condemn the act 
is to misunderstand why I think forgiveness should sometimes be withheld. It is not to make a 
statement about the wrongness of the act—that is inherent (or should be) to the process 
already—there is no purpose to the unforgiving attitude. It is a response, a reaction to a certain 
type of evil, and is a response in accordance to principles of self-respect and respect for others. 
Maintaining an unforgiving attitude under the conditions I have explicated has no purpose in the 
way Wolfendale might suggest and tries to make no statement. Rather, it is merely the most 
morally responsible approach under specific circumstances, so that condoning and condemning 
have little to do with it. Again, the fact that forgiveness and resentment are being considered 
already implies the act has been condemned and will remain condemned throughout the entire 
process.   
 Of course, the proponents of forgiveness might argue that my insistence that resentment 
can be a better response than forgiveness when the wrongdoer is unapologetic will perpetuate a 
cycle of anger and hate. Glen Pettigrove has written about “consequence-driven” objections to 
forgiveness—broadly, this is the idea that forgiving the unapologetic may lead to an undesirable 
consequence.146 Because Pettigrove’s discussion of this type of objection to forgiveness closely 
mirrors what I imagine an argument against my own claims would be, it will be useful to 
explicate what he finds troubling about objections these forgiveness.  
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 Pettigrove’s primary qualm with an argument, like mine, that advocates resentment, 
reflects Joseph Butler’s observation in his sermon. Butler wrote, “Resentment towards any man 
hath plainly a tendency to beget the same passion in him who is the object of it; and this again 
increases it in the other.”147 Resentment, when expressed to the wrongdoer by the victim, is 
likely to incite a reaction of resentment in the wrongdoer toward the victim, which will in turn 
provoke a bitter and endless cycle of anger. Pettigrove has argued that, by conditioning 
forgiveness such that the wrongdoer must be repentant (my third argument), one fails to 
recognize the potential positive consequences of forgiving the unapologetic suggested by 
Butler.148  
 At this point, after I have addressed several counter arguments to my conditions for 
forgiveness, it would be useful to delineate the difference between resentment and revenge, 
because I can imagine general opposition to my account of the virtue of resentment being based 
on an understanding of resentment as synonymous with revenge.  
Resentment, as with other attitudes, can of course be taken to excess or be misdirected. 
Butler’s fear was that resentment is an emotion that can be dangerous for its owner.149 
Resentment can be painful and distressing; it can interfere with personal relationships, and can 
dominate a person’s life.150 But this kind of unconditional resentment is not the qualified kind to 
which I have been referring. Revenge, a potential consequence of excessive resentment, is not in 
question here. Revenge implies action and a calculated reactive response to an injury. 
Resentment understood in this paper has lacked the retributive quality associated with revenge. I 
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have argued that forgiveness is the overcoming of resentment, and in turn, when forgiveness 
cannot be offered in congruency with moral principles, resentment should persist.  
The persistence of resentment, then, is distinct from the cultivation and acting out of 
vengeance. Conceivably an objection could be lodged against my argument that is concerned 
with the possibility of violence and hostility when forgiveness is withheld. I would respond to 
this in two ways. First, I would maintain that there is a difference between revenge (which might 
include violence) and resentment. The former is an act; the latter is an attitude. I am not 
promoting the sort of excessive resentment that could lead to retributive action. Granted, there 
may be no way of controlling this, and long-term resentment may manifest itself in vengeful 
acts. Nevertheless, I would argue that resentment has its place, conditionally, just as forgiveness 
has its place, conditionally.  
I would also clarify that this discussion has not centered on mere interpersonal 
indiscretions or everyday gaffes and insults. The idea that some acts are unforgiveable, and their 
effect on the offender is irreversible, pertains to extreme, horrific atrocities. Average conflicts, I 
would argue, are generally forgivable, since—they can be resolved without jeopardizing moral 
principles. Rather, the kind of evil with which I am concerned is the kind that threatens hope, 
ethics, social stability, and faith. The consequences are far from trivial—to forgive evil of this 
caliber may be equally as wicked as the act itself because it is a major affront to our humanity.  
 
Conclusion 
The goal of this paper has been to look more closely at the relationship between 
forgiveness and resentment, and to question the popular theological and philosophical treatment 
of forgiveness as an unconditional virtue. I have argued that the way in which forgiveness can, 
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and should be, conditioned—by a certain constellation of circumstances—to be morally 
acceptable. When one can offer forgiveness and still maintain self-respect, respect for others and 
the moral community, and when the offender is repentant, then I believe forgiveness can be 
considered virtuous. If one of more of these conditions is unmet, then I maintain forgiveness 
cannot be rightly considered virtuous.  
 I have attempted to demonstrate that because no person is infallible, and because time is 
irreversible, we are constantly faced with the problem of resolution. Of the two attitudinal 
options available to us—forgivingness or resentfulness—forgivingness is often purported to be 
the better option. It is, some have argued, more conducive to psychological peace, societal peace, 
and congruent with the tenets of Christian doctrine. The forgiving attitude, embedded in an ethic 
of Divine Command through Biblical injunctions to forgive our enemies, and confidence in the 
ultimate goodness of all of humanity, has been adopted by philosophical, sociological, and 
psychological rhetoric. A consequence of this, I have argued, is that forgiveness has been revered 
as an unconditional virtue across theological and philosophical lines.  
 The challenge of this project was to demonstrate the ways in which this might not always 
be true. To be sure, forgiveness has its merits. However, my argument has been that in certain 
circumstances of grave, dehumanizing evil, forgiveness is not virtuous insofar as unconditional 
forgiveness cannot always be beneficial for the forgiver, or willed to be a universal good. 
Because forgiveness and resentment operate in tandem, when forgiveness is withheld because it 
cannot be morally justified, then resentment is a more virtuous attitude. This is not to say that 
resentment is easier, or more cathartic, or will lead to reconciliation—it is certainly a difficult 
position to maintain. Nevertheless, unconditional forgiveness for the type of transgressions I 
have in mind has its own dangers which I believe are more perilous for the moral community 
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than the consequences of resentment. At the outset, I asked what happens when a sense of moral 
responsibility is impossible to reconcile with forgiveness? Ultimately, I believe that this paper 
has presented a compelling argument that resentment can be the answer to this problem.  
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